[EM] Nomination

[Forest Simmons]

In the unlikely case that all candidates are approved by all voters and
there is no "beats all" candidate, then the winner shall be chosen from
the Smith set by random ballot.

Since none of these candidates were disapproved by any voter, all voters
should be content (if not ecstatic) about the outcome. 

Forest

On Tue, 17 Apr 2001, Richard Moore wrote:

> Is something missing here? Suppose nobody truncates and there is no pairwise
> "beats all" winner?
> 
> Richard
> 
> 
> Forest Simmons wrote:
> 
> > I would like to nominate Approval Completed Condorcet as a method, and
> > give a campaign speech in favor of it.
> >
> > In this version of Approval Completed Condorcet, regular preference
> > ballots are used with no special marks.
> >
> > All ranked candidates are considered approved and all unranked (truncated)
> > candidates are considered unapproved (and for pairwise comparison
> > purposes, below all of the ranked candidates).
> >
> > If pairwise comparisons yield a "beats all" winner, then that's our
> > guy/gal.
> >
> > Otherwise, the most truncated (least approved) candidates are eliminated
> > from the contest one by one (starting with the worst) until there remains
> > a unique "beats all" winner.
> >
> > Campaign Speech:
> >
> > This method has the main advantages of Condorcet and Approval without
> > their main commonly perceived disadvantages:
> >
> > It is the only Condorcet method satisfying the Favorite Betrayal Criterion
> > while allowing more expressivity than plain Approval (the only other
> > contender that satisfies the FBC).
> >
> > Majority defense by truncation works as well in this method as any other.
> > Even the low utility accidental Condorcet Winners will be cut off by the
> > natural disapproval manifest in truncation.
> >
> > No complicated, confusing Condorcet completion method needs to be sold to
> > the voting public.
> >
> > The strategy is easy: just sincerely rank all of the candidates down to
> > and including the one you would vote for under plurality. Be sure to leave
> > the most evil front runner unranked.
> >
> > This is the only method in the running so far that completely solves the
> > spoiler problem in the psychology of Green IRVies, since they think that
> > having to approve Gore as well as Nader (under plain Approval) is a form
> > of spoilage.
> >
> > Vote for the best, vote ACC !
> >
> > Forest
> 
>