[EM] Some brief campaign argument

[Anthony Simmons]

>> From: LAYTON Craig
>> Subject: RE: [EM] Some brief campaign argument

>> 1) Approval is unique in that a sincere vote is always the
>> best strategic vote.  However, this is because you are
>> only allowed to express a single layer of preferences - if
>> you're preference is A>B>C, you can only express the
>> preference A>B or B>C (in addition to A>C).  If you choose
>> to express A>B, the system forces you to express B=C, even
>> though this may be far from your sincere preference.  It
>> is only a severe restriction on the preferences you can
>> express that gives Approval this property, so I don't see
>> it as an advantage.

I wonder if other methods have this same characteristic even
if they don't seem to.  IRV, for example, allows you to
specify a complete ranking, but during the actual counting,
at any given time, you are either voting for a candidate or
you aren't.  While this looks like a ranking on paper, it
seems to function more like Sequential Approval.  Much like
Approval, except that instead of approving the lot all at
once, you approve and disapprove in turns.