Mixed Condorcet-Plurality

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

bmbuck at 14850.com wrote--

Approval: Not Applicable (Not enough information on ranked ballots to use 
Approval)

If all the applicable methods give the same result, I'm uncertain what the 
example is trying to show.  That Plurality sometimes gets it right?

Here's an example where Plurality, Condorcet, and IRV all yield different 
results!

45 ABC
35 CBA
20 BCA

Plurality: A wins
IRV: B is eliminated, and 20 votes transfer to C, C wins
Condorcet: B defeats A 55:45, B defeats C 65:35, B wins
---
D- The Approval test is rather critical.

If an Approval *1* vote is deemed to be a YES vote, then -- once again -- 
which choice, if any, has majority YES acceptance / tolerability (in both my 
example and the Buck example above) ???

Is voting on candidates somehow different from voting on YES/NO ballot issues 
???

There may be cases when a popular choice dies just before an election--- 
which happened in the U.S.A. Senate election in Missouri in Nov. 2000.

The remaining choices ALL may be unacceptable.  Using ONLY a ranking method 
may produce a false winner.

A math test for computer program folks --- How often will 3 or more choices 
get YES majorities for a single executive or judicial office (President, 
Governor, Mayor, etc.) (using YES/NO) and end up in a circular tie (using 
Number Voting - 1, 2, etc.) ???