Mixed Condorcet-Plurality

[Tom Ruen]

This is an example that Condorcet handles reasonably because there are no
cycles. B and C have a united coalition - one of them is guaranteed to win
by any good method.

The question here in judging between using Runoffs or Condorcet is whether
you want A supporter's second rank preference to decide a winner between B
and C. Since B and C have a mutually united coalition we might imagine they
were in the same party and a primary could have chosen between them which
should run against A. Well, I mean this shows why IRV can replace primaries
while Condorcet can not.

My original email said use Condorcet if there is a candidate that beats all
others in pairwise elections and otherwise use plurality among the top set
of mutually pair-defeatable candidates.

Tom

From: "Buddha Buck" <bmbuck at 14850.com>
To: <election-methods-list at eskimo.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 10, 2001 3:30 PM
Subject: Re: Mixed Condorcet-Plurality

[snipped]
...
> Here's an example where Plurality, Condorcet, and IRV all yield different
> results!
>
> 45 ABC
> 35 CBA
> 20 BCA
>
> Plurality: A wins
> IRV: B is eliminated, and 20 votes transfer to C, C wins
> Condorcet: B defeats A 55:45, B defeats C 65:35, B wins


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Craig Carey wrote:

> The groups named as using the Approval Vote are not using the method in
> government or local government run large scale public elections where a
> lot of the public is uninterested in the Approval Vote method or
> not well uneducated (or does not like voting methods that no nation's
> government seems to use).

So what? Smaller organizations can be used as models or test beds for
larger organizations. The mechanics of Approval Voting are the same.
Don did not specifically ask for an example of a public election and I see
no reason why one is needed.

I checked the IEEE web site and although I found results from past
elections I only found overall totals, not combination subtotals. Maybe
the American Statistical Association would be more interested in reporting
such statistics.

Richard


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I must reply (rarely) to Mr. D's postings---

All multiple office at large elections have an element of Approval Voting--

Multiple judges being elected at large in an area (often counties) and many 
city/ village/ township legislative body elections (as long as there is not 
an overvote -- which happens quite a bit when the number to be elected is 
over circa 3).

With AV there would be no *overvotes* for such offices.