[EM] SARC definition improvement

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Russ--


Let me paste this section to the beginning of this message, becaues
it hopefully answers Markus' question once & for all:

Look, Markus, WDSC & SDSC talk about some particular A, some particular
B, and some particular majority, in isolation. It talks about what
that majority can do. No mention is made about what some other majority
can or cannot do. You name an A & a B, and a majority who prefer A to
B, and it says that that majority that you've named has a way of ensuring
that B won't win, without voting a less-liked candidate equal to or
over a more-liked on (if the crierion is SDSC). If the method meets
SDSC, then your majority will indeed be able to make B lose. What
anyone else can or cannot do is quite irrelevant. The criterion makes
no mention of what someone else can or can't do, or how someone
else votes.

Nor does it say anything about how anyone outside your majority must vote.
They can vote any old way they want to, and, if the method meets SDSC,
then your majority can make B lose without voting a less-liked candidate
equal to or over a more-liked one. The criterion says nothing about
how others must vote.

Those 2 criteria talk about some A, any A you name, some B, and
some majority who prefer A to B. Any A, B, & majority preferring A
to B that you care to name. It talks about them in isolation, making
no mention or requirements about what anyone else can or cannot do,
or about how anyone else may vote. Markus, you'll understand it better
if you pretend that you name a candidate A, a candidate B, and
a majority preferring A to B. The criterion says, that that majority
has a way of making B lose without voting a less-liked candidate
over a less-liked one (or equal to it, if it's SDSC). The criterion
makes no mention of what anyone else can do or how they must vote.

Ok?

Now for Markus' latest letter & my reply:

I'd said:

> > Now you're saying that standards on which criteria are based
> > mean nothing because maybe someone will agree with the standard
> > and not like the criterion. Are you saying that you don't
> > agree that SFC, GSFC, WDSC & SDSC measure for the majority rule
> > standard.
>

Markus said:

>You will have to rephrase this because I have absolutely no idea
>what you mean.
>

Ok, here's what I meant:

You seem to be saying that it means nothing when I claim that a
certain criterion is justified by a certain standard, because someone
who likes that standard might not like that criterion.

That's what I meant. Do you know what majority rule means? It means
that a majority should be able to get its way. If someone believes in
majority rule, they want a majority to be able to get its way. Now,
would they want that majority to need more drastically insincre
stratgy in order to get its way, or would they want that majority to
need less drastically insincere strategy to get its way. I suggest
that the latter is more likely. You're way out on a limb when you say
that people who like majority rule would want a majority to need
more drastically insincere strategy in order to get their way. For one
thing, insincere strategy can cause results that the user of that
strategy doesn't like. Insincere strategy always carries that risk.
For another thing, no one likes their true preferences to be concealed,
as happens when voters are strategically forced to reverse a preference.
> > Only if they imagine something that I didn't say. I didn't say
> > that all 3 majorities should be able to simulataneously use their
> > SDSC power to defeat all 3 candidates. I said that each one of
> > those majorities should have a way of voting that will defeat
> > a certain candidate, under those conditions.
>
>On the other side in your definitions you don't say that not all
>3 majorities are able to simultaneously use their SDSC power.

Markus apparently wants me to add to SDSC & WDSC:

"This criterion doesn't require that more than one majority be able
to simultaneously use the power that the criterion describes.",

...or words to that effect. The wording of a criterion tells what
it requires. It doesn't tell everything that it doesn't require, nor
would that be possible. If the criterion's wording doesn't say that
more than 1 majority must be able to simultaneoulsy do what the
criterion refers to, then the criterion isn't requiring that, is it.

I could add those words, but it would unnecessarily lengthen SDSC
& WDSC.

Look, Markus, WDSC & SDSC talk about some particular A, some particular
B, and some particular majority, in isolation. It talks about what
that majority can do. No mention is made about what some other majority
can or cannot do. You name an A & a B, and a majority who prefer A to
B, and it says that that majority that you've named has a way of ensuring
that B won't win, without voting a less-liked candidate equal to or
over a more-liked on (if the crierion is SDSC). If the method meets
SDSC, then your majority will indeed be able to make B lose. What
anyone else can or cannot do is quite irrelevant. The criterion makes
no mention of what someone else can or can't do, or how someone
else votes.

Nor does it say anything about how anyone outside your majority must vote.
They can vote any old way they want to, and, if the method meets SDSC,
then your majority can make B lose without voting a less-liked candidate
equal to or over a more-liked one. The criterion says nothing about
how others must vote.

Ok?

The fact that the criterion doesn't state the requirements that you
ask about, regarding what other majorities can do, or about how other
people vote--that means that the criterion doesn't have those
requirements.

> > But if the worst that you can say is that you misunderstood it,
> > without showing ambiguity; or that a criterion of a different
> > type could be written (but without writing one), what that shows
> > is that you can't find a genuine problem with the criteria.
>
>In so far as Bruce explained in great detail where he had problems
>understanding your definitions, I don't understand your comment.

I don't know how to say it more clearly: You haven't shown that the
criterion's wording is ambiguous. All we have is that you & Bruce
claim to misunderstand it. Unless you can show an ambiguity, then
your misunderstanding is your own fault, not that of the criterion.
That's what I meant.

That demonstates a certain desperation in your effort to find
criticism.

>
>WSDC says: "If a majority of all the voters prefers A to B, then
>they should have a way of voting that will ensure that B cannot win,
>without any member of that majority voting a less-liked candidate
>over a more-liked candidate."
>
>Bruce mainly criticized two points.
>
>First: Your definition doesn't say whether in a given example the
>WDSC power can be used for only one pair of candidates A and B or
>for several pairs of candidates simultaneously.

I answered that above. I'll paste it here:

Look, Markus, WDSC & SDSC talk about some particular A, some particular
B, and some particular majority, in isolation. It talks about what
that majority can do. No mention is made about what some other majority
can or cannot do. You name an A & a B, and a majority who prefer A to
B, and I say that that majority that you've named has a way of ensuring
that B won't win, without voting a less-liked candidate equal to or
over a more-liked on (if the crierion is SDSC). If the method meets
SDSC, then your majority will indeed be able to make B lose. What
anyone else can or cannot do is quite irrelevant.

Nor do I say anything about how anyone outside your majority must vote.
They can vote any old way they want to, and, if the method meets SDSC,
then your majority can make B lose without voting a less-liked candidate
equal to or over a more-liked one.

Ok?

>
>Second: Your definition doesn't say what a "way of voting" is. Is

Markus wants to know what a way of voting is :-)

>Is a "way of voting" a "way of voting such that independently on how
>the other voters vote" or a "way of voting such that if the other
>voters vote sincerely" or whatever?

Allow me to paste part of the above answer here again:

Nor do I say anything about how anyone outside your majority must vote.
They can vote any old way they want to, and, if the method meets SDSC,
then your majority can make B lose without voting a less-liked candidate
equal to or over a more-liked one.

Ok?

As I said, the criterion's wording doesn't speak of what other
people should or shouldn't be able to do, or how they must vote.
Therefore the criterion makes no requirement about those things.

>
>It is true that you have answered these questions. But nevertheless
>you haven't changed your definitions accordingly. Therefore Bruce's
>criticism is still valid.

Bruce's criticism and yours are not valid.

> > Being able to defeat some greater evil without an unnecessary
> > degree of insincere voting obviously reduces the lesser-of-2-
> > evils problem, because that's what that problem is about. It
> > also accomplishes that goal that you expressed: protecting
> > sincere voters.
>
>On the other side in so far as SFC, GSFC, WDSC and SDSC are
>ill-defined it is arbitrary to ask whether your "lesser-of-
>two-evils" criteria or BC are more obvious and intuitive.

You haven't shown that SFC, GSFC, WDSC or SDSC are ill-defined.

You've told us of your fallacious reason for saying that WDSC &
SDSC are ill-defined, but you haven't even given a reason for
claiming that SFC & GSFC are ill-defined. Is it that they're
ill-defined because you say so?

And, again, I haven't clarified ambiguous wording--I've explained to
you something that isn't ambiguous, but which you merely didn't
understand. Do you still say that you don't understand it?

> > You know that PC violates SARC, but you feel as if PC
> > as-good-as-meets SARC, because you've found a case where
> > PC doesn't violate SARC.
>
>I wrote:

[...]

>Therefore it is clear that I didn't claim that PC meets SARC.

My above words didn't say you thought that PC meets SARC. I'm saying
that you know that PC doesn't meet SARC, but you feel that if
you can find a case where a method doesn't fail a criterion, that
method is as good as if it met the criterion. And, since that method
is just as good, then the criterion must be valueless :-)

>
>Au contraire: I demonstrated that -although Approval Voting
>meets SARC and PC violates SARC- Approval Voting doesn't
>deter less from showing up than PC.

Deterring showing up isn't something that appears in the wording.

As I said, it's nice if people who don't vote dominated strategies
can't defeat their 1st choice or elect their last choice.


Mike Ossipoff


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