Request for sincerity formulae and 2 sincerity numbers; SDSC

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Mr. Carey wrote-

Mike Ossipoff has been writing about reducing/minimizing the
"need for insincerity".

I request that the "need for insincerity" numbers be stated.
The moment they are defined, there could be a simple minimizing of
the need for insincerity quantities over all the finite number of
different sets of possible winners. Imaginably some highly
unsatisfactory preferential voting method would be found but I
guess that Mike Ossipoff can't estimate what the need for
insincerity is.

I reply:

There are several degrees of insincerity: order-reversal,
insincere equal ranking of candidates for whom one votes, and
truncation.

Feel free to number those degrees of sincerity if you want to
rate insincerity numerically.

As I said in my posting, there are various degrees of limiting
to whom the protection applies. FBC protects eveyone. SARC protects
all who vote undominated strategies--which means everyone.
WDSC & SDSC protect the majority who prefer A to B, as regards what
it takes to defeat B. SFC & GSFC have a similar limitation, but
also stipulate that there's no falsification of preferences, no voting
of unfelt preferences. Additionallly, SFC only applies when there's
a sincere CW.

You'd like to compare the effectiveness of completely different
criteria in reducing insincerity need, numerically. For instance,
someone could ask counts as more: Approval's FBC & SARC compliance,
or Tideman(wv)'s SDSC, SFC, & GSFC compliance. I wouldn't know how to
assign numbers to try to answer that numerically. It's my personal
impression that SFC & GSFC are very powerful because complying methods
can be completely strategy free for some voters under some plausible
conditions. But that's only an impression, and I don't have a
quantitative approach to comparing effectiveness of completely
different criteria.

Mike Ossipoff




----
D- In the single winner case, the sincere/ insincere situation happens when
there is (guess what)- a divided majority.

Polls before the election show *roughly* a *sincere* possible vote of

26 ABC
25 BAC
49 C[A=B]

Some of the C voters may want to be insincere and rank A > B or B > A.

Some of the first choice A and B voters may then want to be insincere. Not 
so
amazing.

I say so what. Majority rule is majority rule.

My standard mantra- an election method works on the votes cast (not added or
removed votes -- unless some major felonies are being committed).

To get ONLY *sincere* votes would require something like lie detectors
connected to the (now no longer secret) ballots.  No thanks.


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