[EM] SARC definition improvement

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Markus wrote:

>
>suppose that candidate X is the expected winner if every
>voter votes sincerely. Then -to my opinion- an "offensive"
>strategy is a strategy that a given voter uses to make a
>candidate win who is prefered by this voter (due to his
>sincere preferences) to candidate X. And -to my opinion-
>a "defensive" strategy is a strategy that a given voter
>uses to make not a candidate win who is not prefered by
>this voter (due to his sincere preferences) to candidate X.
>In other words: A "defensive" strategy is a counterstrategy;
>a "defensive" strategy is a reaction to a predicted
>strategy of another voter.

In my preliminary reply I agreed that that strategy is "offensive"
in another sense--aesthetically offensive, or offensively
ill-advised, and something that tends to elect an offensive
person.

But I don't agree that it's offensive strategy in the sense that
you were using the term in your letter, and in the sense that
we here use the term "offensive strategy".

You say that strategy is offensive if it tries to get a different
result than the all-sincere result. I can't tell you how you
should define "offensive" & "defensive". But "offensive" implies
that someone is being offended against, someone with a rightful
win. Or some rightful result is being offended against. Do you
believe that Plurality's result is rightful when everyone votes
sincerely and a sincere CW loses? Because if that isn't a
rightful result, it doesn't sound convincing to say that
strategy to elect the sincere CW is "offensive strategy".

I claim that my definition of defensive strategy is more in
keeping with what we'd agree is a rightful or wrongful result.

Strategy intended to gain a result that a majority wants, or
to protect the win of a sincere CW is what I mean by defensive
strategy.

Strategy intended to change the victory from a not-majority-defeated
candidate to a majority defeated candidate, or to take the
win away from a sincere CW is what I'd call offensive strategy.

As for what I mean by "...that a majority wants":

A majority has the power to gain any result it wants. It has
the power to elect someone if a majority wants to elect him.
It has the power to prevent the election of someone whom a majority
want to prevent the election of.

If a majority all want a certain candidate to win, they don't
need strategy with any of the methods being proposed here.
Probably not with any method other than Borda. They merely all
vote him as favorite.

The problem is when all that a certain majority agrees on is that
there's someone whom they don't want to elect. In that case,
with most methods, some sort of strategy is needed to ensure that
that person won't win. The majority defensive strategy criteria
are explicitly about that.

Now, I realize that the only time you're sure you want someone
to win is if they're your favorite, and the only time you're
sure you don't want someone to win is if they're your last choice
(because if it were him or someone you like even less, you'd rather
he win). But still, the voting of LO2E voters is intended to make
someone lose. The LO2E voter is more interested in making a certain
candidate lose than he is in electing the one whom he would mose
like to elect. So I feel that it's important to deal with what
people have to do to make someone lose, which is what the LO2E
voter insists on doing.

So I feel that majority will, or sincere CW status, is more
justifiably something for defining "offensive" & "defensive" by
than what some bad method would do if everyone voted sincerely.

Does the will of the majority or the sincere CW's right to win
count for less to you than what Plurality would do under sincere
voting?

Mike Ossipoff



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