Methods of elimination in quota preferential STV

[Bart Ingles]

True, if the voter gives her entire vote to a single candidate when that
candidate was in no danger of losing.  But candidate elimination removes
part of the incentive to vote for too few, in that you are less likely
to see all your candidates lose because you spread your vote too thin
(if your party is weaker than you thought, only one candidate would be
eliminated & the votes redistributed, instead of eliminating most or all
of them at once).

So the problem should be less severe than with traditional limited vote
or cumulative vote.


LAYTON Craig wrote:
> 
> This system has the same problem as limited vote systems.  That is, if a
> single candidate is very popular, this could disadvantage the party that she
> is standing for, as she will accumulate votes at the expense of other
> members of the same party.  Penalising a party for having a popular
> candidate is an anomolous result.
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bart Ingles [mailto:bartman at netgate.net]
> Sent: Sunday, 8 October 2000 15:09
> To: election-methods-list at eskimo.com
> Subject: Re: Methods of elimination in quota preferential STV
> 
> DEMOREP1 at aol.com wrote:
> >
> > Mr. [Ingles] wrote in part-
> >
> > Voters simply vote for multiple candidates, as they would with approval
> > voting, except that each choice gets an equal fraction of the vote (e.g.
> > if you vote for five candidates, each gets 1/5 of your vote).  You then
> > eliminate the weakest candidate and recount, so that the remaining
> > candidates get a larger share (if one candidate was eliminated from your
> > ballot, the remaining candidates now each get 1/4 of a vote).  Continue
> > eliminating candidates in the same fashion until the required number
> > remain.
> > ----
> > D- As with Approval Voting with single winners, the A=B=C notion is false
> in
> > most cases.
> 
> What is 'the A=B=C notion'?
> 
> > However, it is simple (but probably requiring computerized elections due
> to
> > the fractions).
> >
> > A possible minor problem with the end result-
> >
> > 3 member legislative body
> >
> > winners and their votes
> >
> > A       B       C
> >
> > N1     N1     N1  (1/3 votes)
> > N2     N2           (1/2 votes)
> >          N3     N3  (1/2 votes)
> > N4              N4  (1/2 votes)
> > N5                     (1 vote)
> >         N6             (1 vote)
> >                   N7   (1 vote)
> >
> > Would each winner have a voting power in the legislative body equal to the
> > votes he/she receives ???
> 
> I'm not sure what is being shown in the above example.  Are A, B, and C
> the candidates, and N1-7 the voters?
> 
> If instead you meant to show a 7-way tie, then it would need to be
> resolved in the same way as any other system.
> 
> Bart