Majority winner set

[LAYTON Craig]

If you like Alice and Bob the same, then voting for one of them is in some
sense strategic, no matter how you choose between them, because you are
artificially voting one candidate over another in order for your vote to
have an effect on the election (ie be a valid vote).

-----Original Message-----
From: Martin Harper [mailto:mcnh2 at cam.ac.uk]
Sent: Friday, 1 December 2000 12:49
To: election-methods-list at eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Majority winner set


> Mr. Schulze wrote in part--
>
> To my opinion, "sincerity" must be defined in such a manner that at least
> a given voter, who changes his voting behaviour because of strategical
> considerations after he has got additional information about the voting
> behaviour of the other voters, votes "insincerely."

Is there not a difference between voting insincerely and voting
strategically?
For example, if I like Alice and Bob equally in a plurality system, then a
cross-mark for Alice, and a cross-mark for Bob are both sincere votes.
Suppose I
use a dice to initially decide, and pick Alice. then I get info from polls
and
discover that the race is between Bob and Charlie, and change my vote. This,
by
Mr. Schulze's requirement, is insincere.

But if in the same case the dice happens to pick Bob, then presumably this
would
be a sincere vote? But to have the sincerity of my vote effectively decided
by a
dice seems, well... odd at least. Don't like it.

Martin