More 0-info pairwise strategy

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Mr. Schulze wrote-

> Suppose that p(B,A) is the calculated probability that
> you change the winner from candidate B to candidate A
> when you vote A > B > C > D sincerely. Suppose that
> p(B,C) is the calculated probability that you change
> the winner from candidate B to candidate C when you
> vote A > B > C > D sincerely. Suppose that u(X) is your
> von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of candidate X. Then:
> If p(B,A)*(u(A)-u(B)) < p(B,C)*(u(B)-u(C)), it is
> advantageous for you to vote A = B > C > D insincerely
> instead of A > B > C > D sincerely.
----
D- Assuming there are polls before the final mark- the- ballots election, 
then with

N1 AB N2
N3 BC N4
N5 AC N6

the N numbers must all be rather close for "you" (i.e. John/Mary Q. voter) by 
yourself (without any other devious voters) to change the results sincerely 
or insincerely.

I assume no one is in favor of abolishing pre-election polls (???) which 
would provide all sorts of information.