[EM] More 0-info pairwise strategy

David Catchpole s349436 at student.uq.edu.au
Wed Mar 29 14:23:17 PST 2000


On Wed, 29 Mar 2000, Markus Schulze wrote:

> Suppose that p(B,A) is the calculated probability that
> you change the winner from candidate B to candidate A
> when you vote A > B > C > D sincerely. Suppose that
> p(B,C) is the calculated probability that you change
> the winner from candidate B to candidate C when you
> vote A > B > C > D sincerely. Suppose that u(X) is your
> von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of candidate X. Then:
> If p(B,A)*(u(A)-u(B)) < p(B,C)*(u(B)-u(C)), it is
> advantageous for you to vote A = B > C > D insincerely
> instead of A > B > C > D sincerely.

...this implies non-zero information. Can I just say that our discussions
of "black-box" strategy are really freaking me out? This is some weird
philosophical **** going down.

It seems we must always have some kind of information or assumptions about
the "black-box" situation to which we are responding- in other words, it
is not possible to have a zero-information situation.

> 
> Markus Schulze
> schulze at sol.physik.tu-berlin.de
> schulze at math.tu-berlin.de
> markusschulze at planet-interkom.de
> 
> 

--------------------------------------------------------------------
Politeness be sugared, politeness be hanged,
Politeness be jumbled and tumbled and banged.
It's simply a matter of putting on pace,
Politeness has nothing to do with the case.
						Norman Lindsay
						"The Magic Pudding"



More information about the Election-Methods mailing list