[EM] extending Myerson's test--more policy positions

[David Catchpole]

On Fri, 17 Mar 2000, Bart Ingles wrote:

> 
> David Catchpole wrote:
> > I'll announce the approval/cumulative voting strategy that I think is
> > useful for voters with little information about other voters. There are n
> > candidates. Vote for the n/2 or n/2 + 1 candidates you most prefer.
> > 
> > Any other suggestions?
> 
> 
> The proven optimal strategy when no strategy info is available is to
> vote for candidates for whom the voter gives above-average utilities

As in above-median ;> ? I take it as a basic rule of thumb that the
optimal strategy when no strategy info is available, in any game, is
unrelated to relative magnitudes of utility. If I'm wrong in this case,
could you direct me to the proof in question?

> I wonder what strategy is optimal under a pairwise system?  Should you
> refuse to rank candidates whom you rate below a certain number?  If your
> favorite is one of two known front-runners with a 50-50 chance of
> defeating the other front-runner, it would seem advantageous to refuse
> to rank anyone whom you would rate below the middle of the scale.

The optimal strategy when no strategy info is available, for a Condorcet
completion system, is sincere expression of preferences... Anyone dare to
argue? Huh? I would feel that any additional strategy brought about by
extra information would depend on the completion.

> 
> Does this sound valid?  If so, is there a corresponding strategy for
> candidates you would rate above a certain level, e.g. should you rank
> some of them as equal to your favorite?  This seems less likely, but I
> wonder if anyone has calculated the optimal strategies for
> utility-maximizing voters.  I'm ignoring the possibility of using
> order-reversal here for simplicity.
> 
> 

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