[EM] "Power" in Approval voting

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

>There might be a dispute here on whether a voter's power should
>   be defined in such an arbitrary narrow contrived way that the
>   Approval Vote is allowed to pass.

There surely might always be dispute from you :-) But the fact
that an interpretation of "power" doesn't make Approval look bad
isn't reason that it's wrong. Or if, for you, it is, then
you aren't being honest.

>At 16:21 08.03.00, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>  >
>  >EM list--
>  >
>  >Craig Carey's objection to Approval, based on a misconception of
>  >power, is probably something that will often be heard when
>  >Approval is proposed. So I'd like to answer it here.
>  >
>
>To use that word "misconception" suggests that you have the term
>   defined. I need a general definition of the power of a voting
>   paper.


Define it as you like, but it may or may not make sense to others.

>I may write to Mr Donald Saari and inquire into why Borda is not
>   fair. I presume there is no intent to make it fair. I presume
>   readers of this list and Mr Saari's student are satisfied that
>   Borda is an unfair method, because it is not a method that is
>   used?.

Borda is unfair, but not because of non-use.

>
>  >Argument #1:
>  >
>  >As Bart asked, can Craig or anyone else supply an example in
>  >which some voter doesn't have the power to cancel-out any
>  >other voter that he wants to?
>
>That question is interesting and narrowly constructed. Polticians
>   could have a lot of trouble assuming a viewpoint that allows the
>   Approval Voting method to pass. They can be rapid thinkers,
>   when consider excessive improper hostile influence from unknown
>   'plebs'. And why not AV method advocates too?.

And you aren't unknown? Hostile influence? Politicians would
have to do a better job of it than you have if they want to
claim that Approval gives voter too much power. I fully admit
that Approval gives the voters more power than FPTP does.


>The Approval Voting method is able to be an extremely unfair
>   method. I don't know if it is actually used.

It's used by mathematical & engineering professional societies,
with combined membership in excess of 600,000. That includes
the IEEE. It's used to choose the U.N.'s Secretary General, though
the result is subject to veto. Political elections? It or
equivalent procedures have been and may still be used in some
East European countries. But if we judge merit by prior use, then
we'll never improve what we've already been using. Following
tradition isn't always the best way to achieve progress.

>Before ending, I note that old FBC definition did not constrain the
>   number of winners. Mr Ossipoff said he regarded the number of winners
>   to be 1. If that is true then it should be in the definition.

We're talking about single-winner methods. If Approval, or any
method returns a tie, then some tiebreaking procedure would
be used to choose a single winner. To the extent that they're
applicable, the existing tiebreaking rules already on the books
are good enough.

I never said anything about whether the method being tested
by the criterion is able to elect more than one winner
(temporarily, till some tiebreaker is applied). If you feel that
that issue is somehow relevant to the criterion's meaning then
you'd need to show that.

Mike Ossipoff

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