Democratic symmetry

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Rob Lanphier wrote-
That doesn't matter, does it?  Very simple example:  4 candidates (A, B,
C, and D), 3 voters.  Here's the ballots:

           Points for A    Points for B    Points for C    Points for D
A>B>C>D         4               3               2               1
A>B>C>D         4               3               2               1
B>C>D>A         1               4               3               2

Totals:         9              10               7               4

B wins under Borda, even though B would lose in FPTP, IRV, Condorcet, and
most other methods.
----
D- Simple Borda fails because on EACH ballot (i.e. the vote of one voter) for 
ANY two paired choices there is a only ONE vote 

1 A > [0] B
1 B > [0] C
1 C > [0] D
1 D > [0] A
etc.

(and NOT X points based on relative position (pos) of the choices being 
paired - such as A (pos 4)> D (pos 1) (3 pos Difference) in A>B>C>D).

I find it difficult to believe that the preceding has not been brought up 
numerous times since Borda used the method in the 1770's (a mere 220 plus 
years ago).