Approval Voting fish (4) : Corrections

[Craig Carey]

At 00:07 06.03.00 , Craig Carey wrote:
...

The '6' I wrote of, below, is meant to be 15 - 7, i.e. it ought be 8.

In any case the 2 paragraphs "Why have the Approval Vote allow 6
 options ... published" are dumb and based on a wrong number. The
 Approval Vote could accept 8 free variables, with one being the
 count of papers that were not marked (however it is independent
 of that). Mr Ossipoff wrote on "favorites", "compromises", & "last
 choices", which are in general, not derivable from any of the
 the 7 parameters. Although the "favorite" could be known if there
 were 15.

----------------------
:Why should a 3 candidate 1 winner Approval Vote election have 15 papers
: when an STV election has 9 papers with unique effect (but 15 in fact).
:
: Why have the Approval Vote allow 6 options of making a votes that have
: no influence?. It is nice and symmetrical for sure. I do suggest that
: the designers of the method may have been grogg...
----------------------
...
:X = (A,  AB, AC, B,  BC, BA, C,  CA, CB, ABC, ACB, BCA, BAC, CAB, CBA)
:P = (a0, ab, ac, b0, bc, ba, c0, ca, cb, abc, acb, bca, bac, cab, cba)
:
:Y = ({A},{B},{C}, {A,B}, {B,C}, {C,A},         {A,B,C}        )
:P = (a0, b0, c0,  ab+ba, bc+cb, ca+ac, abc+acb+bca+bac+cab+cba)
:
...


:There were constraints that led to the choice of weights
: (1, 1, 1, 1, ... 1, 0, 0, 0, ... ).

This next line is wrong in my opinion:

:Numbers like that don't come from nowhere. It is too narrow a ...

(Mr Fishburn has been publishing an average of about 13 papers per month
 since about 1965: [prolific])

This could next might have been what Bart's had in mind, quote below:

:A lot of voters may want to elect their candidate, not figure out
: how to adapt to having 3-200 times more power than they reasoned that
: they deserved, knowing that actually using that power could cause one
: of their preferred candidates to lose. An option would be to use IRV
: instead.
:

However, if there are many competing factions and many winners are to be
 elected, then voters would get extra power to pair them and help cause
 one of the pair to lose:


At 00:26 06.03.00 , Bart Ingles wrote:
...
>If you have candidates A, B, C, and D, and your minister casts a single
>'sub-vote' for B (using your terminology), you might represent it as:
>(0, 1, 0, 0).
>
>Any other voter can neutralize it with the following single vote,
>consisting of three sub-votes:
>(1, 0, 1, 1)
>
>Since only the exact complimentary vote can precisely cancel out the
>minister's vote, the second voter has no leeway to try to cancel other
>votes as well.

A beforehand assumption about aims.

>
>
>If this were FPP, it would take 3 other voters to cancel the minister's
...
>(1, 0, 0, 0) + (0, 0, 1, 0) + (0, 0, 0, 1)
>

This is prompted by a private from Mr Cretney, who has a site here:
  http://www.fortunecity.com/meltingpot/harrow/124

---------------------

The list of corrections is sure to be incomplete.

Bart was commenting on my use of axioms and then failing methods
 with them: something about not leading to an understanding.