[EM] Fearful Symmetry

[Bart Ingles]

Here is my response to the Economist article:
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Dear Editor:

Even if we accept Dr. Saari's use of symmetry in explaining voting
system behavior ("Democratic Symmetry", March 4, page 83), the proposed
Borda system fails to respect such symmetries when voter strategy is
taken into account.  The most effective way of voting under Borda is
often to rank a strategic "lesser evil" choice first and strongest rival
last, with true first and last choices ranked somewhere in between.  The
result would thus tend to resemble that of common plurality voting.

While there is no way to force a voter to show a sincerely held
preference order, we can get halfway there by restricting point
assignments so that sincere and tactical choices are treated equally. 
Both sincere and tactical first choices thus receive one point each,
with less desired candidates receiving zero points.  The resulting
system is known as approval voting, since the voter simply indicates
either approval or non-approval for each candidate on the ballot.

Approval voting thrives on voter strategy, and may well come closer to
Borda's theoretical results than Borda itself in the real world
(although emulating Borda is not approval voting's goal).  Approval
voting also works with any existing voting equipment; in fact several
prominent mathematics and engineering organizations have been using it
in internal elections since the 1980s.  These include the American
Statistical Association[1], the Mathematical Association of America[2],
and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)[3].

Bart Ingles
San Jose  CA
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References for above organizations' use of approval voting:

[1] See Article III (VOTING), Section 2 (Balloting):
    http://www.amstat.org/about/bylaws.htm

[2] See Article IV,  Section 2(b):
    http://www.maa.org/aboutmaa/bylaws.html

[3] See IEEE Bylaws, I-310. Nominations and Elections, last two
sentences of section 13 (text quoted below):
    http://www.ieee.org/about/whatis/bylaws/i-310.html

>     [...]  In any election in which two or
> more nominees' names appear for election to the same office
> on the ballot, any eligible voting member shall be permitted to
> vote for (and thereby to approve of) as many or as few of the
> nominees for such office as the eligible voting member
> chooses to vote for, without limitation, except that the eligible
> voting member may not vote more than once for the same
> nominee in such election for election to such office. Subject to
> Bylaws I-302.13 and I-308.13, the nominee for each office for
> which the election is being held receiving the greatest number
> of qualified votes shall be declared elected. In the event of a tie
> vote, the Board of Directors shall choose between the
> nominees involved.
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For a more authoritative background on approval voting, you might try
contacting Dr. Steven Brams of NYU:

[]

Dr. Brams seems especially appropriate as a source for any follow-up
discussion on voting systems, since he has been engaged in a long-time
debate with Dr. Saari on this topic and is familiar with Saari's work.