Fw: IBCM, Tideman, Schulze
DEMOREP1 at aol.com
DEMOREP1 at aol.com
Sun Jun 4 14:35:50 PDT 2000
Mr. Schulze wrote-
When we talk about Sequential Dropping (SD) then I have to say
that -to my opinion- the biggest problem of SD is its violation
of Independence from Clones when there are identical elements in
the pairwise matrix.
Example:
Suppose that the Senate uses SD to elect its President pro
tempore. Suppose that 50 Senators are Democrats and 50
Senators are Republicans. Suppose that the Democrats
nominate three candidates A1, A2 and A3 and that the
Republicans nominate only one candidate B. Then a possible
situation looks as follows:
40 Senators vote A1 > A2 > A3 > B.
35 Senators vote B > A2 > A3 > A1.
15 Senators vote B > A3 > A1 > A2.
10 Senators vote A3 > A1 > A2 > B.
-----
D- The Voters (repeat Voters) have an absolute right to vote for clones if
they so desire.
A while back Mr. X (I forget who) said that *true* clones (such as M, N) must
be next to each other in rankings ( 3 C > M > N > S, 7 N > M > S > C,
etc.).
Obviously, internally within a 3 or more member clone set (group), not all
clones are equal.
In the above, dropping B for a moment (produces the old 3 choice circular
tie)---
40 Senators vote A1 > A2 > A3
35 Senators vote A2 > A3 > A1
25 Senators vote A3 > A1 > A2
65 A1 > A2 35
75 A2 > A3 25
60 A3 > A1 40
Doing place votes with B returned---
Place Votes
1 2 1+2
A1 40 10 50
A2 0 75 75 Earliest Majority of 100
A3 10 15 25
B 50 0 50
100 100 200
The above is yet another variation of the often seen divided majority/
divided minority situation (this time with a tie).
I bring up again my suggestion for (1) a YES/NO vote on each choice with (2)
only YES majority choices going head to head and (3) have a summed place
votes tiebreaker if there is no head to head (Condorcet) winner.
How many could be getting a YES majority (especially A3) ? If all 4
candidates got exactly 50 votes then there might be some pressure on A3 to
drop out.
The minority would have a choice of voting for the least perceived evil among
the majority clones (as a compromise) or not voting for any clone (i.e.
letting an overall majority within such overall majority determine the
choice).
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