[EM] Problems with finding the probable best governor

[Bart Ingles]

MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> 
> >The point is that the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of a choice is
> >defined by the willingness of someone to make that choice, as opposed to
> >a ratings system where someone assigns values (sincere or otherwise).
> >This means that even sincere ratings would not necessarily be accurate
> >for a real voting system -- the only way for a real voting system to
> >reflect vN-M utilities is to force the voter to weigh risks and benefits
> >of each choice.
> 
> But isn't it true that if the voter maximizes his expectation of
> sincere utility (ratings proportional to how good each candidate
> really is for him), that he'll be better off? Even if he doesn't
> feel good about voting that way? If he'd vote differently when
> using vN-M utility, doesn' t that mean that the kind of "utility"
> that he's maximizing, based on his lottery-valuations isn't the
> kind that actually does him any good? Isn't the benefit of
> sincere utility more real? He has an illusory notion of what's
> best, based on lottery-valuations. If he votes according to that
> notion, doesn't he suffer in terms of really getting the best
> that he can, materially? You can say "Who's to say which
> feelins are more real?", and that the vN-M ratings are genuine for
> him--but isn't the bottom line what he's got after the election,
> averaged over all the elections, when those lotteries are in
> the past & no longer matter? We're not talking about the kind

I guess I view vN-M utilities as the "ultimate sincere utility", since
it has an external frame of reference (risk).  By simply rating some
alternatives 0 through 10, different voters could have different ideas
about what 5 means, given identical circumstances.  Being able to
compare benefit against some known (or assumed) risk provides a form of
calibration.  And over the long run, over many elections, vN-M utilities
SHOULD represent the best deal, unless the voter is wrong about the
levels of risk.

Sincere ratings are unobtainable anyway in real life (vN-M utilities
could probably be inferred from voter decisions, at least in some
cases), and simulations don't distinguish between the two definitions of
utility.


> of risks where Regis invites you to risk $5000 to win another
> $5000, because you have only a tiny chance of influencing the
> election anyway, and that should wipe out the fear-factor, shouldn't
> it? Shouldn't that make voters more rational & objective, and
> not risk-averse? So then isn't "bottom line", rather than skittishness,
> what would influence the voter? Now, if it were only possible to
> convince all the obedient types who are all following eachother
> to vote for someone whom they all like less in November, doing so
> because they figure that eachother will. November 2000 seems to me
> to come close to being a UUCC example.
> 
> And if voters really are irrationally skittish, should we
> encourage that error by advising them to calculate a kind of
> utility that accommodates their skittishness?
> 
> >It seems to me to be manipulable by the way that candidates position
> >themselves, though, at least in theory.  A candidate just has to look
> >for races where the existing candidates are on opposite sides of the
> >voter median on important issues, and split the difference -- more a
> >concern if Markus is correct rather than Mike regarding the likelihood
> >of low SU winners.
> 
> If the candidate positions himself optimally, and keeps his
> campaign promises, then there isn't really a problem. Voters should
> be able to recognize dishonesty & corruption before the election.
> I certainly did in '92, and didn't vote for anyone whose last name
> starts with "C".
> 
> You're concerned that a candidate might fool the voters, or
> violate his campaign promises. Hopefully the voters weren't so

That's not my concern at all -- mine is that the Democratic voters might
vote for some poorly qualified (read: non-positional disutility)
candidate (who happens to be in the center) over an evil Republican, and
vice-versa, so that both sides end up electing someone that they both
hate.  As you have pointed out, voters make similar lesser-evil choices
already, but under the current system this favors the existing major
parties.

This may well be less of a concern when more candidates are in the race,
and any change from the current system would probably attract more
candidates, but I wouldn't want to count on there always being more than
a few candidates in a race.

Bart


> much gullible in '92 as they were resigned & desperate. Let's not
> call these things a problem of Condorcet's method. With Condorcet
> , voters won't be resigned to giving up, and will vote someone they
> really like over that candidate who is obviously an opportunist
> who may or may not keep his promises. And, as I said, there will
> be better selection, and candidates who are genuine, unlike now.
> 
> Mike Ossipoff