[EM] Problems with finding the probable best governor

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

>
>The point is that the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of a choice is
>defined by the willingness of someone to make that choice, as opposed to
>a ratings system where someone assigns values (sincere or otherwise).
>This means that even sincere ratings would not necessarily be accurate
>for a real voting system -- the only way for a real voting system to
>reflect vN-M utilities is to force the voter to weigh risks and benefits
>of each choice.

But isn't it true that if the voter maximizes his expectation of
sincere utility (ratings proportional to how good each candidate
really is for him), that he'll be better off? Even if he doesn't
feel good about voting that way? If he'd vote differently when
using vN-M utility, doesn' t that mean that the kind of "utility"
that he's maximizing, based on his lottery-valuations isn't the
kind that actually does him any good? Isn't the benefit of
sincere utility more real? He has an illusory notion of what's
best, based on lottery-valuations. If he votes according to that
notion, doesn't he suffer in terms of really getting the best
that he can, materially? You can say "Who's to say which
feelins are more real?", and that the vN-M ratings are genuine for
him--but isn't the bottom line what he's got after the election,
averaged over all the elections, when those lotteries are in
the past & no longer matter? We're not talking about the kind
of risks where Regis invites you to risk $5000 to win another
$5000, because you have only a tiny chance of influencing the
election anyway, and that should wipe out the fear-factor, shouldn't
it? Shouldn't that make voters more rational & objective, and
not risk-averse? So then isn't "bottom line", rather than skittishness,
what would influence the voter? Now, if it were only possible to
convince all the obedient types who are all following eachother
to vote for someone whom they all like less in November, doing so
because they figure that eachother will. November 2000 seems to me
to come close to being a UUCC example.

And if voters really are irrationally skittish, should we
encourage that error by advising them to calculate a kind of
utility that accommodates their skittishness?

>It seems to me to be manipulable by the way that candidates position
>themselves, though, at least in theory.  A candidate just has to look
>for races where the existing candidates are on opposite sides of the
>voter median on important issues, and split the difference -- more a
>concern if Markus is correct rather than Mike regarding the likelihood
>of low SU winners.

If the candidate positions himself optimally, and keeps his
campaign promises, then there isn't really a problem. Voters should
be able to recognize dishonesty & corruption before the election.
I certainly did in '92, and didn't vote for anyone whose last name
starts with "C".

You're concerned that a candidate might fool the voters, or
violate his campaign promises. Hopefully the voters weren't so
much gullible in '92 as they were resigned & desperate. Let's not
call these things a problem of Condorcet's method. With Condorcet
, voters won't be resigned to giving up, and will vote someone they
really like over that candidate who is obviously an opportunist
who may or may not keep his promises. And, as I said, there will
be better selection, and candidates who are genuine, unlike now.

Mike Ossipoff

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