Fwd: Re: [EM] Problems with finding the probable best governor

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Bart wrote:

>I guess I view vN-M utilities as the "ultimate sincere utility", since
>it has an external frame of reference (risk).  By simply rating some
>alternatives 0 through 10, different voters could have different ideas
>about what 5 means, given identical circumstances.

But the voter only needs his own ratings. But, as you say
below, maybe it's more difficult to estimate sincere ratings.

>  Being able to
>compare benefit against some known (or assumed) risk provides a form of
>calibration.  And over the long run, over many elections, vN-M utilities
>SHOULD represent the best deal, unless the voter is wrong about the
>levels of risk.

But the voter's vN-M utilities before a particular election,
based on risk-aversion and how he feels about the outcomes
over the past decades, those two views might involve
conflicting kinds of utility. And after those decades of
elections, the voter will most likely agree that, on the average,
over a long time, he'd have been better off if he'd used
sincere ratings instead of his risk-averse vN-M utilities.
Of course I admit that before a particular election is when
the decision has to be made, when the risk-skittishness influences
his expectation in a valid way. But because he has such a small
chance of influencing the election, how much is fear, as opposed
to objective, rational principle, going to influence his vote?
One can afford to be especially principled when it's unlikely to
matter materially which choice one makes.

>
>Sincere ratings are unobtainable anyway in real life (vN-M utilities
>could probably be inferred from voter decisions, at least in some
>cases), and simulations don't distinguish between the two definitions of
>utility.

Yes, that hadn't really occurred to me, that sincere ratings
might be more difficult to guess than hypothetical lottery
choices. I'm not completely sure. But is estimating what you'd
do in a hypothetical lottery any easier than just estimating
the best way to vote, directly? If not, then there'd be no
point in guessing the lottery choices, and calculating
strategy based on those, rather than just intuitively guessing
the best way to vote. Both are perfectly valild. Isn't the
latter just as valid, & just as easy, as the lottery guess?

But I'm not saying for sure that I believe that you aren't
right about that. When I determined how I'd vote in the SF
mayor race, among 5 candidates, I estimated sincere ratings,
and win probabilities, and used Tideman's suggestion for
using win probabilities to get Pij. I felt that guessing the
sincere ratings was easier for me than guessing the best way
to vote. Maybe that's because one's guess about the best way
to vote depends on (without really considering them) one's
ratings of the candidates. I felt that I might as well estimate
that separately, and use it, rather than estimate something that's
based on those ratings plus the probabilities. I felt that, the
way I did it, I was estimating less. On the other hand, though,
maybe it's better to guess the best way to vote, rather than
address the sincere ratings directly. I don't know. But the
vN-M utility approach seems in the middle, without the
arguments of either extreme. Isn't it just as valid, & just as
easy, to guess what feels like the best way to vote in the actual
election, as to guess what feels like the best choice in those
hypothetical lotteries? If so, then the vN-M approach merely
adds unnecessary complication. This is a subjective matter, and
I'm not entirely sure that your position isn't more right, for
all strategizing voters. But what I've said above sounds convincing
to me.

>That's not my concern at all -- mine is that the Democratic voters might
>vote for some poorly qualified (read: non-positional disutility)
>candidate (who happens to be in the center) over an evil Republican, and
>vice-versa, so that both sides end up electing someone that they both
>hate.

If the voters weren't fooled, then, for the Democrats, Perot
really is better than the Bush, and for the Republicans, Perot
really is better than Clinton.

But if Perot's nonpositional disutility is so great that they'd
hate electing him more than they'd hate the opposite extreme,
then they shouldn't vote for him over the opposite extreme.

Mike


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