[EM] California Internet Voting Task Force Report (FWD)

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         http://www.ss.ca.gov/executive/ivote/


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California Internet Voting Task Force

January 18, 2000


The California Internet Voting Task Force was convened by Secretary

of State Bill Jones to study the feasibility of using the Internet to

conduct elections in California. More than two dozen experts in the

field of data security, elections and voter participation were asked

to volunteer their time and expertise in the development of this

report. The recommendations, analysis and suggested technical

requirements that follow represent the collective opinion of the task

force.


Final Report Online


Executive Summary


    Opinion of the Task Force


Major Findings and Recommendations


    Definitions of Internet Voting

    Evolution of Internet Voting

    Internet Voting Process

    Technical Issues

    State and Federal Election Laws

    Impact on County Election Officials

    Public Acceptance


Task Force Composition


    Regular Task Force Members


Introduction


    What is Internet Voting

    Brief History of Voting Systems


Task Force Findings


    Comprehensive vs. Incremental Approaches to Internet Voting

    Model of a Remote Internet Voting System

    Implementation of Internet Voting

    Four Stages of Internet Voting


Task Force Findings and Recommendations on Policy Issues


    Additional Convenience to Voters May Help Improve Participation

    Voter Accessibility to the Internet

    Internet vs. Paper Ballot Voters

    Procedural Differences Between Precinct, Paper Absentee Internet

Voting


Appendix A Online

Technical Committee Recommendations


Online


  1.Scope of the Technical Committee Report

  2.General conclusions of the Technical Committee

  3.Internet voter registration

  4.Internet Petition Signing

  5.Internet Voting

  6.Security in i-voting

  7.Internet voter education and support

  8.General Requirements for i-voting systems

  9.Requirements for the Vote Server Data Center (VSDC)

 10.Requirements for the Internet Voting Process

 11.Glossary


Appendix B Online


    Public Policy Institute of California Statewide Survey:

Californians and Their

    Government, December 1999



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FULL TEXT OF EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ONLY:


California Internet Voting Task Force


A Report on the Feasibility of Internet Voting


              January, 2000



          Internet Voting Report


     Executive Summary


          The California Internet Voting Task Force was convened by

Secretary of State Bill Jones to study the feasibility of using the

Internet to conduct elections in California. More than two dozen

experts in the field of data security, elections and voter

participation were asked to volunteer their time and expertise in the

development of this report. The recommendations, analysis and

suggested technical requirements that follow represent the collective

opinion of the task force.


     Opinion of the Task Force


          The implementation of Internet voting would allow increased

access to the voting process for millions of potential voters who do

not regularly participate in our elections. However, technological

threats to the security, integrity and secrecy of Internet ballots

are significant. The possibility of "Virus" and "Trojan Horse"

software attacks on home and office computers used for voting is very

real and, although they are preventable, could result in a number of

problems ranging from a denial of service to the submission of

electronically altered ballots.


          Despite these challenges, it is technologically possible to

utilize the Internet to develop an additional method of voting that

would be at least as secure from vote-tampering as the current

absentee ballot process in California. At this time, it would not be

legally, practically or fiscally feasible to develop a comprehensive

remote Internet voting system that would completely replace the

current paper process used for voter registration, voting, and the

collection of initiative, referendum and recall petition signatures.


          To achieve the goal of providing voters with the

opportunity to cast their ballots at any time from any place via the

Internet, this task force believes that the elections process would

be best served by a strategy of evolutionary rather than

revolutionary change. This report defines four distinct Internet

voting models and the corresponding technical and design requirements

that must be met when implementing any of the stages.


          One of the most difficult tasks for an Internet voting

system is the authentication of voters. To ensure that every voter

has the opportunity to cast a ballot and no voter is able to vote

more than one time, this task force believes election officials

should initially test Internet Voting technology through the use of

Internet Voting machines that are under the direct control of

election personnel in traditional polling places.


          Eventually, election officials can transition toward

allowing voters to cast ballots at publicly accessible county-

controlled kiosks or computers and, in the future, provide the option

of remote computer voting from any computer with Internet access.


          If remote Internet voting is eventually adopted, this task

force believes that current technology requires that it initially be

modeled on the current absentee ballot process in California.

Although the procedures used to request an Internet ballot in this

model would be more cumbersome than traditional e-commerce

transactions, it is the only way to tie the authentication of voters

from the existing paper voter registration system to the electronic

arena at this time.


          We believe that additional technical innovations are

necessary before remote Internet voting can be widely implemented as

a useful tool to improve participation in the elections process in

California. However, current technology would allow for the

implementation of new voting systems that would allow voters to cast

a ballot over the Internet from a computer at any one of a number of

county-controlled polling places in a county.


          As with most computer systems, increased security and

higher levels of privacy can be provided by increasing the complexity

and the burden on the user of the system. The success or failure of

Internet voting in the near-term may well depend on the ability of

computer programmers and election officials to design a system where

the burden of the additional duties placed on voters does not

outweigh the benefits derived from the increased flexibility provided

by the Internet voting system.


          The democratic process warrants an extremely high level of

security, but the security measures can not be so cumbersome to

voters that the new process would prevent participation. An

appropriate balance between security, accessibility and ease of use

must be achieved before Internet voting systems should be deployed.


     Major Findings and Recommendations


          Definitions of Internet Voting


          For the purposes of this report, an Internet Voting System

is defined as an election system that uses electronic ballots that

would allow voters to transmit their voted ballot to election

officials over the Internet.


          Internet Voting means the casting of a secure and secret

electronic ballot that is transmitted to election officials using the

Internet.


          An Internet Voting Machine is defined as the computer

hardware that allows an electronic ballot to be cast over the

Internet.


          Polling Place Internet Voting is defined as the use of

Internet Voting Machines at traditional polling places staffed by

election officials who assist in the authentication of voters before

ballots are cast.


          Remote Internet Voting means the unsupervised use of an

Internet Voting Machine to cast a ballot over the Internet using a

computer not necessarily owned and operated by election personnel.


Authentication of the voter would rely on procedures outlined later

in this report, but must include some form of identity verification

that is at least as secure as existing voting procedures.


          Evolution of Internet Voting


          The implementation of Internet Voting will be a complex

undertaking with no room for error. This task force recommends a

phased-in approach to developing an Internet Voting System that will

allow election officials and voters the opportunity to identify any

possible problems before they occur.


          Phase One of the task force’s recommendation would provide

for the use of Internet Voting technology in a supervised setting

like a traditional polling place. In this phase, voters would not yet

gain the advantage of voting from any place at any time, but the

integrity of the voting and tabulation technology will be verified

through the use of Internet Voting Machines.


          Phase Two of the task force’s recommendation would allow

voters to cast Remote Internet Ballots. The authentication of voter

identity would take place with a combination of manual and electronic

procedures that would provide at least the same level of security as

the existing voting process.


Internet Voting Process


          For the foreseeable future, Internet Voting should be

viewed only as a supplement to, not a replacement of, traditional

paper-based voting.


          The design of any Internet voting system must be at least

as secure against fraud as the current absentee ballot process in

every respect.


          All election activities stem from voter registration which

is a paper-based system maintained locally by 58 county election

offices. Until digital signatures and digital identification are a

common aspect of everyday life for all Californians, on-line

registration and the eventual collection of on-line petition

signatures for initiative, referendum and recall campaigns should not

be made available.


          Until the voter registration rolls contain a digital

signature or biometric identification for all registered voters,

requests for Remote Internet ballots must be made on paper with a

manual signature that can be compared against the manual signature on

the voter’s registration card. Voters will be provided a digital

signature for voting purposes once the manual signature on the

Internet ballot request and the paper voter registration card are

verified.


          Internet voting systems must be designed to protect the

secrecy of the ballot, while providing election officials with an

audit trail that can be used to conduct recounts of election results.



Technical Issues


          Potential criminal electronic attacks on computer software,

such as destructive "viruses" or "Trojan Horse" software, create a

serious threat to Internet voting. To minimize the potential

technological threats to Internet voting, election officials should

provide unique operating system and web browser software to voters.


          To achieve the required level of security for a remote

Internet ballot, voters will be required to take several

precautionary steps before voting. For remote Internet voting to be

successful, the burden of the additional duties placed on voters must

not outweigh the benefits to be derived from the increased

flexibility provided by an Internet voting system.


          Ballot integrity and secrecy can be protected while ballots

are transmitted over the Internet through the use of digital

signature and encryption technology. All identifying information used

to electronically verify the identity of a voter shall be stripped

from the ballot prior to the tabulation of the votes to ensure the

secrecy of all Internet ballots.


          Although the voter’s ballot will be protected from

alteration or infringement of privacy as it travels over the

Internet, the ballots of voters who access the Internet through a

local area network may have their privacy breached by a network

administrator who can access the voter’s computer while the ballot is

in an unencrypted state. To prevent a breach of privacy, voters must

be warned of this potential problem and substantial penalties must be

imposed on network administrators who attempt to violate a voter’s

privacy.


          State and Federal Election Laws


          Several state and federal laws mandate equal access to the

voting process and restrict state and local authority regarding the

implementation of new election laws. Care must be taken to ensure

that Internet voting applications are accessible to all voters.


          Internet Voting opportunities must be accessible to all

voters, including low income voters whose only access to the


          Internet may be through public access Internet terminals

that are commonly available in libraries and schools.


          Internet ballots must be available in multiple languages in

jurisdictions required to print multi-language ballots to conform to

the Federal Voting Rights Act.


Impact on County Election Officials


          County election officials would require significant fiscal

and human resources to undertake the implementation of either polling

place or remote Internet Voting Systems.


          Just as county officials are currently required to ensure

each voter’s paper ballot is configured properly, they would have the

additional burden of simultaneously ensuring proper ballot

configuration on the electronic system.


          County officials would need to ensure that their paper and

Internet voting systems are properly integrated to ensure proper

tabulation of ballots from both systems.


          Voters will receive the information they need to cast and

encrypt their Internet ballot from county election officials.


          County officials will be responsible for comparing

signatures on Internet ballot request forms with each voter’s

signature on their voter registration card. If the signature on the

ballot request form is verified, the county would then be responsible

for providing the voter with an electronic identifier that will be

used for authentication over the Internet.


          Counties will need trained technical personnel to assist

with the implementation of Internet Voting Systems for each election.



Public Acceptance


          Recent public opinion polls show that support for Internet

Voting is strongest among those members of the public who have the

greatest access to and familiarity with the Internet. Younger voters

and voters in the western region of the United States have a higher

degree of Internet proficiency and a higher degree of support for

Internet Voting at this time.


          The plausibility and popularity of Internet voting is

likely to rise over time as public access to and use of the Internet

approaches the levels of home telephone and television usage.


          The level of public support for Internet voting must be

measured in terms of all potential voters, not just the universe of

voters who are likely to utilize this form of voting. If Internet

voting is viewed skeptically by a large number of voters, then the

fundamental trust in the democratic process may be compromised.


For the full report see:

http://www.ss.ca.gov/executive/ivote/