Circular tie solutions should be obvious

Sun Feb 20 20:06:08 PST 2000

Demorep wrote:

>Arranging the pairings high to low--
>82 DE 18
>81 CD 19
>80 BC 20
>79 AB 21
>78 EA 22
>63 CE 37
>61 BD 39
>60 DA 40
>59 BC 41
>57 EB 43
>Which choice is the biggest clone ?
>Obviously E- a clone of D

D & E aren't clones, because B beats D, but E beats B. D & E
would be clones only if, for any candidate other than D & E,
every voter votes D & E the same way with respect to that other
candidate (over, under, equal).

>Of course, in real elections there might/would be more diffusion of votes 
>if ALL the U.S. President candidates in the last year were on one ballot).

They should all be on one ballot, so that we'd be able to
vote all of our preferences, something that we can't do if
a candidate whom we like more than Z doesn't win his primary
& make it to the general election. And we can only vote in one

>In real elections some voters will, of course, rank a copycat clone ahead 
>the original (in politics, music, movies, TV shows or whatever).

But the  better methods aren't affected by clones, at least not
in public elections with lots of voters.

>I mention again- a minority can rank its favorites early, then such 
>can stop voting or rank the lesser of the perceived evils ahead of the
>greater perceived evils.

Insincerely voting a lesser-evil over someone you like more
is something that a majority needn't do, with the better methods.
A minority of the voters can't prevail against a majority,
on a pair-comparison important to that majority, with the best
methods; and that doesn't require insincere strategy by that

Mike Ossipoff

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