[EM] Blake Cretney, are you a member of the Intelligentsiya??

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

I don't reply to everything that Instant Runoff Supporter posts,
but once in a while I comment. I notice that, true to form, he's
again repeating refuted arguments. I'll just briefly point some of
these out.


>- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12/22/00
>Twelve Advantages of Instant Runoff Voting(of Irving):
>
>     1) Avoids Lessor of Two Evils Factor:

We've talked lots about what it means to get avoid the lesser-of-2-evils 
problem. Don talks about it below, and I'll reply some there.


>     2) May allow a strong third party:
>     3) Majority Realized in every Election:

We've talked about the IRVies' delusion about majority. More below
where Don talks about it more.

>     4) Voter Participation Increased:
>     5) Less Negative Campaigns:

Less negative campaigns than what? Condorcet or Approval?


>     6) Primary in General Election Possible:
>     7) Lower Election Costs:

A big IRV election will involve many times the computational task
compared to Approval or Condorcet. It will be a security & verification
nightmare, due to the many more opportunities for fraud & tampering.

Additionally, of course, Approval has none of the set-up cost of
IRV. Approval costs zero to change to.

>     8) Vacancy filled from Data of last Election:

That can be done just as well with Condorcet. Better, in fact, since
Condorcet doesn't have IRV's incentive for strategic voting



>     9) Increases legitimacy of ultimate winner's agenda:
>    10) Brings new ideas and people forward for public scrutiny:
>    11) It makes political debates exciting:
>    12) Voters don't feel disenfranchised:
>
>1) Avoids Lessor of Two Evils Factor:
>    I feel that the number one advantage of Instant Runoff Voting is that I
>will be free to vote for my most preferred candidate, even if he is low in
>the polls, and yet I will still be able to make a lessor of two evils
>choice, if and when it becomes necessary, on the final decision between the
>last two candidates.


...as long as your most preferred candidate is a sure loser. Otherwise,
your vote might still be on him when your needed lesser-evil compromise
gets eliminated. How many times must this be explained to you IRVies?

IRV often will strategically force voters to vote a lower choice
lesser-evil over their favorite. Approval will never do that.
Only in rare contrived cases will Condorcet do that.

A good way to measure the lesser-of-2-evils problem is to find out
if a majority has to resort to lesser-of-2-evils giveaway voting.
That's what the 4 defensive strategy criteria are about. They
can be found at http://www.electionmethods.org

IRV fails every one of those criteria. Approval & Condorcet pass
defensive strategy criteria. The best Condorcet versions have been
shown to pass all 4 of the majority defensive strategy criteria.

What does IRV offer as a lesser-of-2-evils guarantee? Nothing.

Because IRV, like Plurality, only lets you have one vote, to
have on one candidate at any one time, IRV predictably retains
Plurality's lesser-of-2-evils problem.

>    My most preferred candidate will receive far more votes because others
>will be doing the same as I am doing.

No, if they know what they're doing, then they'll often be voting
some lesser-evil in 1st place, over their favorite, to save it from
early elimination, to avoid the election of their last choice.
That's how small party members vote in Australia. Maybe they know
something that you IRVies don't know?



My most preferred could bypass one of
>the top two, maybe even win. But if not, and when the lowest spot catches
>up with him, I will be allowed to change my vote to another candidate, and
>to another if necessary.

...but the compromise that you needed might not be there anymore,
due to IRV's elimination.



Like I said, I'll still have a vote when the final
>decision needs to be made between the last two candidates.
>    I will not have only one choice and be forced to use it on the lessor 
>of
>two evils.

One vote is all you have. And if you don't put it on your lesser-evil,
you might be sorry when he gets immediately eliminated and your last
choice wins because you didn't dump your favorite for the lesser-evil.


>
>3) Majority Realized in every Election:
>    Sometimes in an single-winner election the leading candidate does not
>receive a majority. Do you belive it would be best for a candidate to be
>elected by a majority?

So let's just give someone a majority then :-)

>I have good news for you, it is possible,
>Instant Runoff Voting will elect candidates with majorities in every
>election.

IRVies say that IRV always elects someone who has a majority.
After IRV's rule give him a majority. The legitimacy of that "majority"
depends on the legitimacy of IRV's rules. And IRV's rules must be
good, because they always elect someone who has a majority :-)

It's been pointed out that the IRV winner might just have a majority
against one candidate. First we eliminate all but 2 candidates, and
then, if one has a majority against the other (as must be the case
if no one equal rates any candidates), then our IRVies say that that
candidate is a majority winner, a majority candidate. Sorry, not by
any accepted meaning of the word "majority".

By the way, Don, since you like to spam EM with repetition of refuted
arguments, and with postings from other lists, how about you
post this reply to your IRV list? Cc it here to show that you've
done that.

Mike Ossipoff

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