YES versus Head to Head Tiebreakers

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Applying the original posting in a 2 member district p.r. election (with 2 
distinct groups that just happen to have circular ties)-

YES votes [ONLY]       Max YES for 1st choices
     123
22 ABC                    61
21 BCA                    61
18 CAB                    61

14 FGH                    39
13 GHF                    39
12 HFG                    39

100

No head to head winners

Droop = 34

   1+2        1+2+3    Final (Voting powers)
A  40          0          0
B  43         43         61   B gets the most the earliest
C  39         18          0

F  26         39          0
G  27        39           0 
H  25        39          39  (wins lottery tie)

In other words there are the 3 matrices going on--

YES matrix

      1    2     3     4    etc.   Total YES
A  A1   A2  A3   A4   etc   AT
B  B1   B2  B3     B4  etc.   BT
C  etc

Head to head matrix

       A       B     C     etc
A     X     A/B   A/C  etc
B    B/A    X    B/C   etc.
etc.

Accumulated YES matrix (high to low in each column)

1       1-2    1-3    etc.

B1     C12     D13   etc.
C1     D12     F13    etc.
A1     F12     B13    etc.
etc.   etc.      etc.

Thus, 
1. Vote YES/NO  [from me derived from Approval and standard issue elections] 
and number votes [from Condorcet].
2. Do head to head [from Condorcet].
3. If less than N head to head winners, then accumulate the YES position 
votes to get a Droop quota [from Bucklin and applying number voting to 
Approval] (i.e. an earlier YES ranks more than a later YES).

For proportional representation elections, there probably should also be a 
separate YES/NO and Numbers vote for Parties/Independents (as a party group) 
for the apportioning of the Droop quotas to get seats (using the method of 
equal proportions).

As usual- minorities which can not get a Droop quota would be wise to vote 
YES on additional choices in order to have some influence on the results.

That is- if the above was for a single winner office, then the F, G and H 
first choice voters may also want to vote YES for the lesser perceived evil 
of A, B or C.