[EM] Fixed Terms
Herman Beun
chbeun at worldonline.nl
Fri Sep 24 07:11:29 PDT 1999
As a Dutchman, I should obviouslyy comment on this:
On 24 Sep 99, at 15:28, Markus Schulze wrote:
> I observed that the Swedish option is also used for the upper house
> (Eerste Kamer) of the Netherlands. Article 64 of the 1983
> constitution says: "De zittingsduur van een na ontbinding
> optredende Eerste Kamer eindigt op het tijdstip waarop de
> zittingsduur van de ontbonden kamer zou zijn geeindigd." ("The
> duration of an upper house that meets following a dissolution
> shall end at the time at which the duration of the dissolved house
> would have ended.") But I don't remember that the Eerste Kamer has
> ever been dissolved.
That's correct, but the motivation behind this rule (and the practice)
is slightly different than for the Swedish option. The point is that the
Eerste Kamer is elected indirectly, i.e. is elected by the (directly
elected) members of the Provincial States (the Provincial
parliaments), which do have fixed terms. Therefore, dissolving the
Eerste Kamer does not make much sense, since the new
members are elected by the same Provincial State members, who
always vote for their own party's candidates.
Moreover, the Eerste Kamer, like most other country's Upper
Houses, is not the most important political Chamber and unlikely
to get into serious conflict with the government. That too makes
dissolution less likely.
Actually, I think our Eerste Kamer is pretty useless and should be
abolished. Members do not work full time and meet only one day a
week. It is not, as in federal states, a representation of local
entities because there is no direct link between an Provincial
States member's vote and a specific Eerste Kamer member -- all
Provincial State members together are one single constituency.
The Eerste Kamer is, according to their own definition, a "chambre
de réflexion": they reconsider each new law on constitutionality
(the Netherlands have no constitutional court) and quality.
In my view, the Tweede Kamer (Lower House) can do that too, just
like in Sweden and Denmark. But it is impossible to abolish the
Eerste Kamer: each constitutional change requires a 2/3 majority
in both Houses... Effectively, this Chamber is the main cause of
the Netherlands' constitutional backwardness. Last May, one of
their members blocked even the introduction of the referendum
(popular veto), although (as a compromise to his own conservative
party) the thresholds in the proposal were so high that having a
referendum would have become virtually impossible anyway.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Herman Beun Arnhem, Gelderland, Nederland, EU
HermanB at bigfoot.com http://www.bigfoot.com/~HermanB/
-------------------------------------------------------------
Opschudding in D66: http://welcome.to/opschudding
-------------------------------------------------------------
Representative democracy is a contradiction in 4 year terms
-------------------------------------------------------------
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list