[EM] Proportional preferential voting
David Catchpole
s349436 at student.uq.edu.au
Thu Sep 16 22:29:54 PDT 1999
Oh! It solves the thing on a case by case basis (like finding all examples
of inversion and using the rule to exclude answers)!
On Fri, 17 Sep 1999, Craig Carey wrote:
> I don't appear to have all the equations needed to get a
> complete solution in any 4 candidate problem of my theory.
>
> At 01:55 99/09/17 , you wrote:
> >Dear Craig,
> >
> >could you -please- explain your method using the
> >following example with 100 voters and 4 candidates
> >running for 3 seats?
> >
> >30 voters vote A > B > C > D.
> >26 voters vote B > D > A > C.
> >24 voters vote C > B > A > D.
> >20 voters vote D > B > A > C.
> >
> >Markus Schulze
>
> OK.. here's a rough outline of this method. I am sure it will
> seem defective:
>
> "... solve
> the subproblems, get the rules listed, and when candidate i
> definitely won or lost at some point, cast shadows in every
> direction allowed by the rules throughout the simplex. At some
> points, the number of winners would rise to equal the number
> that had to win the election, and therefore, at each such
> point in the simplex, the losers would all be known. Then the
> shadows for all those losers could be cast.
> The iteration can stabilise without a solution being found."
>
> I could give a sort of answer to the problem from Mr Schulze,
> if the following three 1 winner 4 candidate sub-problems
> were solved (or partly solved)
>
>
> VAD
> -20 D...
> -24 CBA.
> -26 BD..
> -30 A...
>
> VBC
> -20 DB..
> -24 C...
> -26 B...
> -30 AB..
>
> VBD
> -20 D...
> -24 CB..
> -26 B...
> -30 [missing by accident]
>
>
>
> Picking a single winner with votes that are negative.
>
> Notation: V is election system
>
> Try this notation : aV is true iff A wins V
> VA is V with votes after the preference for candidate A discarded.
>
> Then aV = aVA = aVA.-bVAB.-cVAC.-dVAD. That holds for STV & FPP.
> It may hold for Condorcet too? (but not some of the modifications?).
>
> The 3 above because of the solutions I found for VBCD, VACD,...
>
> ("-" is Boolean 'not').
> ("CBA." = "C > B > A > D")
>
> ------------------------------------
> Simplifying concave polytopes would become a problem
> probably. REDLOG seems to be the package to use.
>
> http://www.fmi.uni-passau.de/~redlog/htmldoc/rl_toc.html
>
> One of the authors of REDLOG wrote:
>
> :Try "rlsimpl((a<b) and (a<c) and (2*a<b+c));",
> :but the REDLOG simplifier cannot simplify the formula.
> :
>
> [Note: Some inequality term extracting and expression parsing code,
> can add a convex polytope simplification feature.]
>
> :However, with the quantifier elimination of REDLOG you can prove, that
> :a<b and a<c implies 2*a<b+c:
> :
> : 12: rlqe rlall(a<B and a<c impl 2*a<b+c);
> : ---- (all a b c) [DFS: depth 3, watching 3]
> : [0e] [DEL:0/1]
> : true
> :
> :This allows you to drop the atomic formula 2*a<b+c from the above
> :conjunction.
> :
>
> G A Craig Carey, 08:46 Fri 17 Sept 1999 NZT
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Mr Craig Carey
>
> E-mail: research at ijs.co.nz
>
> Auckland, Nth Island, New Zealand
> Pages: Snooz Metasearch: http://www.ijs.co.nz/info/snooz.htm,
> & Public Proxies, MEDLINE Search, Multithreaded Add-URL
> _____________________________________________________________
>
>
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