[EM] Voting paradoxes article

David Catchpole s349436 at student.uq.edu.au
Thu Sep 16 03:38:03 PDT 1999

On Thu, 16 Sep 1999, Bart Ingles wrote:

> I suppose if you want to base your method on ordinal position, Borda is
> best (at least with sincere voting);  if you are interested in
> preference intensity levels, you will favor approval;  if you regard all
> choices between any pair of candidates to be equally significant, no
> matter how ambivalent the chooser, some Condorcet method would be
> preferred.

"My system is intended only for honest men!" Bloody bloody.

One day I will look through all the Borda and Approval literature and
actually construct my argument against them, because I think both of them
are flawed in their modelling and their logic. But then again, I have a
cynicism for single-seat election systems which will probably lead to
complete disregard.

> Just some musings on the subject would be interesting.  I would think
> that you could identify Condorcet winners within factions if there is no
> cross-voting, but that it could get messy otherwise.

Consider an election of n seats. Are there any combinations of n
"Condorcet winners" who win in any consideration of n+1 candidates? If
there are more than one combinations which do this it becomes more complex
and involves more head-to-head stuff- but, for simplicity, ignore this. I
would argue that this setup (with your choice of election rules for the
n+1->n election and the head-to-head untying elections) is independent of
the removal of irrelevant alternatives wherever an answer exists- just
like Condorcet!

It fits in very well with Droop quota, don't it?

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