[EM] Summary of order reversal software output
Steve Eppley
SEppley at alumni.caltech.edu
Thu May 27 17:04:13 PDT 1999
In another message (my reply to Markus about JITW) I mentioned
that I'd post this summary. There's some more info about
this in that JITW message.
Below is a table of order reversal scenarios in 3-alternative
elections, given various voting methods. (Hopefully I haven't
written buggy software.) The software which generates it also
examines the incentives of the patsy candidate to withdraw if
given the opportunity by JITW to foil the reversal. And it
calculates a variety of stats which might be of interest
(e.g., the number of scenarios where the reversal winner's
sincere Borda score is worse than the sincere winner's
sincere Borda score).
The software produces more files, including the databases of
scenarios, but it seems inappropriate to post it all here.
It's pretty easy for me to code additional pairwise methods.
But to test for reversal scenarios in non-pairwise methods such
as Instant Runoff, the software would need to be partially
rewritten since the reversal strategy in those methods is
not ABC -> ACB. (In Instant Runoff, the successful reversal
strategies are ABC -> CAB and ACB -> CAB, which can defeat B
by elevating C's IRV score ahead of B's. Don't believe people
who claim that reversal cannot succeed in Instant Runoff.)
I've also written software which finds the intersection of the
reversal scenarios of two methods. I wrote this because it
might make sense to use a "combo" method, in which the voters'
preferences are tallied using two different algorithms, and the
overall winner is the pairwinner of the two algorithm-winners.
If the reversal intersection of two algorithms is small, combining
them might thwart reversal better. (But we'd have to also check
for scenarios where reversal succeeds in one algorithm and the
"patsy" wins in the other, since the reversal winner defeats
the patsy pairwise.)
I intend to write software to find the scenarios where truncation
succeeds, and to intersect those with the scenarios where reversal
succeeds, to help provide a more quantitative answer on whether
voters would have an incentive to rank only their favorite.
--Steve
------------------------
The following is best viewed using a monospace (nonproportional)
font and with wordwrap turned off, in my opinion.
Method "VA" is Condorcet{VotesAgainst}.
Method "Copeland" is Copeland//Plurality.
Method "Schz" is Schulze's Method. Though it appears to perform
worse than VA on most stats, it might perform better with more
than 3 alternatives.
Methods TC1 and TC2 haven't been discussed in this maillist.
They perform well at reducing the number of scenarios where reversal
can succeed, at least in 3-alternative elections. Their "sincere
Borda" and "Thwarted Majority" stats appear worse than other methods'
but it's unclear if this is a fair comparison; for example the
75 worst VA scenarios might be as bad or worse on these stats as
the 75 TC1 scenarios.
VOTERS METHOD CWS REVERSALS JITWFOILED BACKFIRES MINREV MINREVS JITWMINREV BORDAWORSE MINRBORDA FAILSDSC BORDAWORST BORDAAVG THWARTMAX THWARTAVG
17 TC1 1254 75 57 0 1 51 39 72 48 0 0.46 0.78 88.2 63.3
17 TC2 1254 79 38 13 1 26 12 65 18 15 0.64 0.88 70.6 57.6
17 Cope 1254 239 239 0 1 51 51 160 18 164 0.70 0.94 58.8 54.2
17 Schz 1254 409 317 0 2 84 56 278 28 0 0.71 0.94 64.7 54.0
17 VA 1254 292 230 0 2 56 39 161 0 0 0.75 0.97 58.8 53.7
18 Cope 1584 140 140 0 2 34 34 116 21 92 0.71 0.90 61.1 56.5
18 Schz 1584 226 191 0 3 56 43 191 36 0 0.72 0.90 61.1 56.3
18 VA 1584 154 132 0 3 35 28 119 15 0 0.76 0.93 61.1 56.1
33 Cope 27132 5788 5739 0 1 680 673 4008 250 3892 0.66 0.94 63.6 54.0
33 Schz 27132 9749 6703 0 2 680 368 6523 120 0 0.69 0.95 63.6 53.5
33 VA 27132 8219 5662 0 2 560 308 4993 0 0 0.71 0.97 63.6 53.3
Key to table:
CWs = number of scenarios where B is sincere condorcet winner
but not the favorite of a majority.
Reversals = number of scenarios where reversal can elect A.
(Smaller is better.)
JITWFoiled = number of scenarios where reversal would probably be
foiled by C voluntarily withdrawing. (CBA/C > 60%)
(Larger is better, but this is relative to Reversals.)
Backfires = number of scenarios where reversal can succeed but too much
reversing backfires by electing C.
(Larger is better since it deters reversal.)
MinRev = minimum number of reversers needed to reverse at least
one scenario. (Larger is better.)
(I don't know if this stat matters. It's probably
1 to 3 regardless of how many voters there are.)
MinRevs = number of scenarios where the number of reversers needed
to successfully reverse equals MinRev.
(Smaller is better.)
(I don't know if this stat is useful, especially
since it depends on the method's MinRev.)
JITWMinRev = number of MinRevs scenarios where reversal would probably
be foiled by C voluntarily withdrawing.
(Larger is better, but this is relative to MinRevs.)
BordaWorse = number of reversal scenarios where A's sincere Borda score
is worse than B's. (Smaller is better.)
MinRBorda = number of MinRevs scenarios where A's sincere Borda score
is worse than B's. (Smaller is better.)
FailSDSC = number of scenarios where reversal isn't thwarted by
by BAC -> B>A=C truncation. (Smaller is better.)
BordaWorst = smallest ratio of A's sincere Borda score to B's.
(Larger is better.)
BordaAvg = average ratio of A's sincere Borda score to B's.
(Larger is better.)
ThwartMax = largest percentage of voters who ranked B ahead of A.
(Smaller is better.)
ThwartAvg = average percentage of voters who ranked B ahead of A.
(Smaller is better.)
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