Riera and Borrell presentation (FWD)

[Michael A. Schoenfield]

I am very interested in your papers relating to voting and those concerned
with electoral colleges. However, I am unable to read PostScript files (Word
97 is my processor program). Can your translate these couple of files to
Microsoft Word (any version) and/or Portable Document File (PDF file) which
can be read using Adobe. I will appreciate any assistance that you can/will
give me in obtaining your papers.

Michael S.
Michael Schoenfield
Michael A. Schoenfield & Associates, Ltd.
2637 Mason Street
Madison, WI 53705-3709

(608) 238-6121 Office
(608) 233-2507 Fax & Internet
maschoen at execpc.com
http://www.angelfire.com/biz/maschoen/

----- Original Message -----
From: <DEMOREP1 at aol.com>
To: <election-methods-list at eskimo.com>
Sent: Wednesday, March 17, 1999 3:48 AM
Subject: Re: Riera and Borrell presentation (FWD)


>Subj:   Re: Riera and Borrell presentation
>Date:  Tue, Mar 16, 1999 4:41 PM EDT
>From:  lorrie at research.att.com
>X-From: lorrie at research.att.com (Lorrie Faith Cranor)
>Sender: owner-e-lection at research.att.com
>To: e-lection at research.att.com
>
>[A clarification from the author.... Note that this and other
>papers are available from the author's web site at:
>http://www.ccd.uab.es/~andreu/indexenglish.shtml --LFC]
>
>From: "A. Riera" <andreu at abra.uab.es>
>
>Hello,
>
>I would like to furtherly clarify some of the points of the
>report by Tatyana Ryutov on our paper at the NDSS '99:
>
>> "Next was an interesting paper "Practical Approach to Anonymity in
>> Large Scale Electronic Voting Schemes" by Andreu Riera and Joan
>> Borrell (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain). Andreu Riera
>> presented.  Their work considered how to implement a realistic large
>> scale voting system.  Their scheme is based on cooperation of multiple
>> hierarchically arranged electoral authorities.
>
>The main aim of the paper is to propose a suitable way to integrate
>the mix functionality into the design of the voting scheme itself,
>thus removing any need for mix-nets. Additional advantages are
>achieved. The hierarchical arrangement of voting authorities that
>allow to realistically implement a large scale voting system was
>adopted from a previous work:
>
>A.Riera, J.Borrell, J.Rifa. Large Scale Elections by Coordinating
>Electoral Colleges. In Proceedings of the IFIP SEC '97 Conference,
>Copenhagen. ISBN 0-412-81780-2, pp. 349-363.
>
>> The advantages of this
>> scheme are: single non-anonymous voting session (a widely accepted
>> solution is based on two sessions anonymous and non-anonymous) and no
>> requirements for external mixes.
>
>The advantages are:
>
>The fairness requirement is fulfilled since all ballots remain enveloped
>while the voting phase is not completed. The voter casts the desired
>ballot
>during a single session established with the ballot collecting
>authority.
>If a ballot is removed from the tally, then there is a mechanism by
>which
>the authority responsible for the election can identify the attacker.
>Problems of low traffic incoming at any shuffling server disappear,
>because shuffling is performed when all ballots are already cast. The
>system is totally self-contained, and therefore its implementation is
>simplified and any dependency on mix-nets is removed.
>
>> The anonymity is provided by
>> shuffling ballot boxes a number of times.  There are restrictions to
>> this approach. The proposed scheme can model all commonly accepted
>> security requirements, except uncoercibility (inability of voters to
>> prove in which way they voted), which require hardware components to
>> be added into the scheme.
>>
>
>A practical proposal to solve uncoercibility without sacrificing
>mobility
>of voters can be found in:
>
>A.Riera, J.Borrell. An uncoercible verifiable electronic voting
>protocol.
>Proceedings of the IFIP SEC '98 Conference, Vienna-Budapest, 1998.
>ISBN 3-85403-116-5, pp. 206-215.
>
>> "A participant asked if the scheme was implemented. Andreu replied that
>> they are working on the protocol.  Someone asked: authentication of
>> the voter is required, how privacy is maintained?  Andreu explained
>> that authentication of the voter private key is required, to assure
>> privacy the blind signature mechanism is used.
>
>Voters are authenticated by the ballot collecting centres, in order to
>preserve the democracy requirement. To assure privacy, we combine blind
>signatures with the mix functionality.
>
>>
>> "Another question was: Is this complexity practical for real system?
>> Andreu: complexity is inevitable.
>
>I meant that electronic voting schemes are inevitably complex in the
>sense
>that many security requirements are involved and they are often
>contradictory.
>However, another question is the computational complexity. When
>designing
>voting schemes that have to be implemented, the complexity of the
>various
>alternative techniques has to influence the choice between them. For
>example, blind signatures and the ANDOS protocol have the same effect
>when used in a voting schemes. The computational cost of the former is
>however much lower than that of the latter.
>
>> Another question was about association between a voter and his vote.
>> Andrew pointed out that it was not possible to detect association
>> between a voter and his vote."
>
>It is indeed not possible to link a voter to his or her vote, PROVIDED
>that at least one of the shuffling servers implementing the mix
>functionality remains honest and uncompromised.
>
>Andreu
>-----------------------------------------------------------
>Andreu Riera Jorba
>Dept. Informxtica
>Universitat AutUnoma de Barcelona
>08193 BELLATERRA (BCN)
>Catalonia - Spain
>
>Phone# +34 93 581 1777
>Fax#   +34 93 581 3033
>E-mail ariera at ccd.uab.es
>WWW    http://ccd.uab.es/~andreu
>
>This message was distributed through the e-lection mailing list.
>For info and archives see http://www.research.att.com/~lorrie/voting/
>