[EM] Net Wins Tiebreaker, Supp. 6

DEMOREP1 at aol.com DEMOREP1 at aol.com
Mon Jun 7 23:31:19 PDT 1999

The Net Wins tiebreaker can be generalized for combinations of multiple 
choices where each choice is majority acceptable (on a simple YES/NO vote and 
there is no Condorcet single winner).  

I repeat -- minority choices have been defeated.  Voters with such minority 
choices can rank the perceived lesser of evils among the YES majority choices 
(i.e. a compromise choice) or drop out (and let the majority group choose a 

Namely  (a dash means versus in the Groupings) -----
Choices   Groupings
2         1-1
3         1-2
4         1-3, 2-2   Start of clone possibilities
5         1-4, 2-3
6         1-5, 2-4, 3-3
7         1-6, 2-4, 3-4    
etc.              etc.

Note the obvious even-odd sets of two.

Example- 5 choices, A, B, C, D and E

One of the 2 versus 3 combinations will have the highest net wins (assuming 
no ties).
Example-  B + E 19   versus  A + C + D -19

or there might be (with a different set of votes)

C + E  -25  versus A + B + D  25

The losing choices would be eliminated.

The choices of the winning combination would go against each other (checking 
for a Condorcet winner among such remaining choices after each elimination).

Note- the net losses of a secondary clone cancels out the net wins of a 
primary clone in clone combinations.

Example-  100 C > D,  C has 100 net wins, D has -100 net wins, a C + D 
combination have 0 net wins with respect to each other.

That is, extreme positive net wins (and corresponding extreme negative net 
wins) are suspects for being clones or very weak choices.

In real public elections for a single office (such as for U.S. President), I 
must question how often 4 or more choices could each get a majority YES vote. 
  If 4 or more choices did get such majorities, then I would estimate that 
there would be multiple clones (such as 5 liberals or 5 conservatives with 
different degrees of cloning among them).

For simplicity purposes (i.e. public understanding), I mention again the 
possibility of just having the highest YES choice win when there is no 
Condorcet winner.  Presumably most of the YES votes come from the left 
portion of a place votes table--
         1     2     3    etc
A     A1   A2   etc.
B     B1    B2   etc
C    etc.   etc.  etc
(e.g. a high percentage of the A1 votes are YES regarding A, a lower 
percentage of the A2 votes are YES regarding A, etc.).
        Total YES
A      AYes
B      BYes
C      CYes
etc.  etc.
One of the choices would presumably get the highest majority of YES votes 
(i.e. a variant of simple Approval Voting).

Note to strategy-conspiracy fans--- with polls being available presumably 
only somewhat serious candidates will be getting YES majorities (i.e. not 
plurality- minority extremists).  

If one or more choices is getting close to a majority YES vote in the polls, 
then strategy- conspiracy folks are taking a very big risk in playing games 
with their YES votes regarding such choice(s).

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