FPTP family theory, REDLOG shadowing

[Markus Schulze]

Dear Craig,

you wrote (11 Dec 1999):
> At 08:37 11.12.99 , Markus Schulze wrote:
> > Craig wrote (11 Dec 1999):
> > > The only methods I favour are IFPP, FTP, and STV. The last is a bad
method
> > > to be elected under, but it has no particular competition that satisfies
> > > SPC. IFPP is undefined for 4 candidates.
> >
> > In so far as you couldn't define IFPP for all situations, you favour only
> > two methods: FPTP and Alternative Voting.
> >
> > Didn't you say that Alternative Voting was "a method too defective to be
> > used in practice" (20 Oct 1999)? [Alternative Voting can punish voters
> > for voting.]
> >
> > What has caused this change of your opinion?
>
> What was written is this:
>
> - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
> At 03:03 20.10.99 , Craig Carey wrote:
> > At 22:57 19.10.99 , Markus Schulze wrote: ...
> > > Do you question that some election methods sometimes punish voters
> > > for going to the polls and voting sincerely? Or do you question that
> > > a voter rather wants to have no influence on the election result than
> > > to worsen the election result?
> ...
> > There are two questions. To the first I reply: no, election methods
> > can punish voters for voting. A proof could involve an analysis of a
> > voting method devised to allow the proof to proceed easily, e.g.
> > a method too defective to be used in practice.
> - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
>
> That word "punish" is undefined (e.g. more than one type of strategic
> voting problem or etc.).

Suppose that candidate A is elected if voter V1 doesn't go to the polls.
Suppose that voter V1 strictly prefers candidate A to candidate B.
Suppose that candidate B is elected if voter V1 goes to the polls.
Then voter V1 is punished.

Can you give a different definition of "punish"?

Markus Schulze