[EM] YES/Condorcet Method

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

5 Choices, single winner

The voters vote YES/NO on each choice (blank vote =NO by default) and number 
vote their choices (blank vote = choice in last place tie).  A YES zone vote 
indicator might be used (e.g. a 4 YES vote might also mean that votes 1 to 4 
are YES, the rest are NO).

22 ABCDE
21 BCDEA
20 CDEAB
19 DEABC
18 EABCD
100

Combined YES votes and Place Votes Table

         1       2      3       Total 1+2+3 YES
A     22    17     16        55
B     21    21     13        55
C     20    20     14        54
D     19    18     19        56
E     18     17     18       55

Note- In a more normal case, there might be a majority after summing the 
votes in the first 2 places.

No first choice majority using number votes.

Pairings
79 AB 21
59 AC 41
40 AD 60
22 AE 78
80 BC 20
61 BD 39
43 BE 57
81 CD 19
63 CE 37
82 DE 18

A>B>C>D>E>A, no Condorcet winner

Head to head matrix

    A   B    C    D    E     Tots
A --  79  59  40  22   200
B 21  --  80  61  43   205
C 41  20  --  81  63   205
D 60  39  19  --  82   200
E 78  57  37  18  --   190
      
T 200 195 195 200 210 1000

          Place Votes Table (with YES and NO votes)

       1      2     3     4     5    Tot
A    22    18   19   20   21  100
B    21    22   18   19   20  100   
C    20   21    22   18   19   100
D    19   20    21   22   18    100
E    18    19   20    21   22   100
     100  100  100  100  100

Accumulated place votes
     1+2     1+2+3   1+2+3+4

A   40         59        79
B   43         61        80
C   41         63        81  
D   39         60        82
E   37         57        78
   200       300       400

Note- Each cumulated sum for a choice might be more than the above YES votes 
for that choice (since number votes do not show absolute support).

Which choice should win ?

Should there be 1 or more interim eliminations ?  If yes, then does moving up 
the relative votes give misleading results ?

One obvious possibility for executive and judicial office elections and issue 
elections ------

If there is no Condorcet Winner using the number votes, then simply pick the 
choice with the earliest/highest majority in the Combined YES votes and Place 
Votes Table.  Thus, D would win.

Note - Since there is no first choice majority in a tiebreaker case, a choice 
needs help (i.e. 2nd, 3rd, etc. choices from other voters to get elected).

There is more complexity for multi- member proportional representation 
elections -- 

The voters would vote YES/NO on each party, each party candidate or 
independent (blank vote = NO by default) and use number votes.  

There might also be fusion/ coalition groups of parties and independents.

If a choice does not get a Droop quota of first choice YES votes, then the 
YES/ Place votes might be summed, as above.

Example-
2 remaining seats to be filled after doing Condorcet comparisons. For simple 
example purposes each Condorcet winner is deemed to receive a Droop quota.  
If a Condorcet Winner gets more votes than a quota due to transferred votes, 
then the excess votes might be retained by the other choices involved (if 
any).

Same starting example.

Combined YES votes and Place Votes Table
Droop Quota = 34

         1       2       Total 1+2 YES
A     22    17          39
B     21    21           42 Wins
C     20    20           40
D     19    18           37
E     18     17          35

Only the minimum of votes to get a quota might be transferred.

         1       2       Total 1+2 YES
A       9     17          26   (A keeps 21 + 22 -34 = 9 place 1 votes)
B      21    13          34  Wins
C      20                   20
D     19    18           37 Wins
E     18     17          35

Final (using original data including YES and NO votes)
B     21 + 22 +18 = 61
D     19 + 20        = 39

I suggest that each proportional representation winner have a voting power 
equal to the final number of votes that he/ she receives.