Most Drastic Falsification?

[Mike Ositoff]

> 
> Hugh R. Tobin wrote:
> > 
> > I submit that a more drastic form of tactical voting
> > [...]
> > is voting for one's last choice first,
> > and as previously noted this tactic by a minority of the supporters of a
> > candidate can sometimes work quite well in IRO.  The plurality wing
> > tries to get the other (more extreme) wing to run second, so as to use
> > the second choices of the middle to prevail.
> > 
> > -- Hugh Tobin
> 
> Not sure I follow -- can you put together an example?
> 
> Bart

Say it's like one of my previous examples:

Sincere preferences:


 44 30 26

  A  B  C
  B     B

In IRO B wins here if voting is sincere. That can happen,
but not often enough to count on. But it happens here, luckily.

But A decides to use pushover strategy, and tells some of his
voters to vote for C in 1st place:

 36  30  34
  A   B  C
         B

***

The pushover strategy could also be done in more complicated
examples, of course. It's a well known vulnerability of
IRO. But I re-emphasize that IRO has a serious problem even
if no one uses offensive strategy.

Mike Ossipoff





> 
>