Order-reversal deterrence -- an old idea?

Hugh R. Tobin htobin at earthlink.net
Tue Sep 22 23:50:57 PDT 1998

Given the credibility problem with order-reversal deterrence strategy by
the "middle" candidate's supporters in Condorcet, I feel sure the
following must have been considered:

Allow a candidate to declare irrevocably in advance (by simultaneous
secret submission), that the second and lower-place votes by voters who
choose that candidate first would not count, either (option 1) for any
purpose; or (option 2) in the tiebreaker in case of a circular tie.
Under option 2 these votes still would count to determine whether there
is a Condorcet winner and who is in the Smith set.  In either case the
candidate's election of this option would be stated in voters' pamphlets
and on the ballot, perhaps with the candidate's explanation for
depriving his supporters of some of their voting power.

Does this concept in either form have a name, and has it been beaten to
death?  I do not  want to burden readers with half-baked analysis of a
discredited notion.  (I realize that if all candidates chose this option
we would have plurality, or a plurality tiebreaker, but I am not sure
how likely that is.)

-- Hugh Tobin

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