Puerto Rico vote update

Mike Ositoff ntk at netcom.com
Mon Sep 14 19:10:42 PDT 1998

> I assume that the voters will NOT be using number votes ( 1, 2,  3) along with
> the standard YES/NO on each choice.   Thus, if 2 or more choices get YES
> majorities, there will be some chaos.
> ------

Well, in California, when we vote between several mutually-
conflicting initiatives the ones with more "No" than "Yes" votes
are disqualified, and the winner is the un-disqualified initiative
that got the most "Yes" votes.

Maybe that's what they're going to do, or maybe they'll just
use FPTP, 1-vote Plurality.


As much as I'd like the opportunity to vote an absolute "No"
on candidates, and giving everyone that opportunity, it
has its disadvantages, and so, instead of the procedure
I described 2 paragraphs back, with the Y/N voting, plain
Approval voting would be better, where voters may give
a vote to any one or more alternatives.

Sure, Condorcet, in any one of the versions we've discussed,
with votes-against, would be best of all, but, to propose 
Condorcet, or any rank-balloting count rule, to people so far
away, for such a major election, would requre at least something
of an organization, and we don't have that. So maybe this would
be one of the situations where Approval would be the better
proposal, even though Condorcet, with votes-against, is the
better method.


My problem with the Y/N voting is that it creates a complicated
strategy. Approvl strategy is relatively simple, but whether
we're talking about the mathematical strategy to maximize
utility expectation, or about the strategy that most people
will use, the strategy is greatly complicated by the addition
of Y/N voting. Of course the rule itself, and the ballot,
are also somewhat complicated by that also.

Also, there'd be lots of strategic "No" voting. Where there
are identifiable extremes, the extreme voters will strategically
vote "No" on the opposite extreme, and middle voters will likely
vote "No" on both extremes, to help them veto eachother :-)
No problem, except that if everyone is vetoed, that creates
a crisis and an embarrassment for the method, and therefore
jeopardizes the reform.



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