Approval voting defects
DEMOREP1 at aol.com
DEMOREP1 at aol.com
Tue Sep 29 19:08:31 PDT 1998
Mr. Ossipoff wrote in part--
As for the people attacking Approval, that method is so simple
that its properties are obvious, and not debatable, so it doesn't
really need any defending.
Demorep1-
Approval is a very major improvement over Plurality but Approval has its own
set of defects.
Approval is very defective in the special case where a choice gets a majority
of first choice votes (if number voting was being used).
Example-- 100 voters
Number of votes in indicated place (if number votes were being used)
View table in Monaco for alignment
1st 2nd 3rd Total
A 9 15 51 75
B 15 51 10 76
C 51 10 61
D 25 9 34
100 95 61 256
B wins using Approval. C has a majority of the first choice votes (and is
thus an automatic Condorcet winner).
That is, the 51 C first choice voters by voting for other choices cause a
defeat for their first choice if Approval is used.
Thus, I have suggested that Approval (in the form of a YES/NO vote) be used
along with number votes.
A, B and C each get YES majorities (assuming the votes for each are YES
votes).
A, B and C would go head to head using the number votes so C would win.
There is also the Approval case if ALL of the choices fail to get majorities
of ALL of the voters.
Example-- 100 voters
President of the U.S.
Total
K 41
L 45
M 43
N 39
Multiply by 1,000,000 for a possible real election.
L wins using simple Approval. I suggest that having minority winners is
extremely dangerous (especially for public chief executive offices who have a
very bad tendency to go powermad -- Johnson, Nixon, Reagan, Clinton, etc.,
etc.).
Another fundamental election reform is having voter recall petitions to remove
from office any legislative body and/or any elected or appointed executive or
judicial officer, if/when they/he/she go(es) powermad.
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