Margins -- Blake is right -- slight amplification (fwd)
Mike Ositoff
ntk at netcom.com
Sun Sep 27 20:24:19 PDT 1998
Forwarded message:
My copy of this reply, addressed to myself, lists only Tobin
in the "To:" line, and I haven't received an EM copy of it. So
it didn't post to EM, & so I'm forwarding it there:
>
> >
> > Hugh R. Tobin wrote:
> >
> > > I agree that votes-against does not permit a rational "defensive"
> > > strategy of truncation; moreover I remain to be convinced that in
>
> Not sure what you mean by that; defensive truncation, in VA, makes
> it impossible to profit by voting an insincere preference, and
> penalizes order-reversal.
>
>
> > > margins it would ever be rational for a voter to truncate, but not to
> > > reverse order.
> >
> > It may not have been clear enough that the second point relates to a
> > separate issue from the first, that is, a charge made on this list that
> > the margins tiebreak allows an "offensive" truncation strategy, which
> > fails in "votes against". Such a strategy has no independent
> > significance because it is only a weaker alternative to order-reversal
> > strategy, which in the right conditions can work under both methods.
>
> No, truncation has independent significance because it occurs in
> all rank-balloting elections, and will surely be common in public
> elections. Margins is vulnerable to it, and VA isn't.
>
> To say that truncation isn't significant because the would-be
> truncator could order-reverse instead in VA is like saying that
> door-locks are useless because the burglar could instead saw a
> hole in the door. It's more trouble, and it carries a great risk.
>
> >
> > I use "truncation" to refer to omitting to express preferences at the
> > bottom of one's ballot when one actually holds such preferences.
>
> That's how I use the word too.
>
> >
> > -- Hugh Tobin
> >
> >
>
>
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