Margins Example Continued (fwd)

Mike Ositoff ntk at
Mon Sep 21 16:03:50 PDT 1998

Forwarded message:

This is in reply to David's recent letter with the same
subject line. After replying, I noticed that my reply wasn't
posted, and that the message's "Reply to:" line wasn't EM. So
l'm forwarding my reply to EM.

> Al
> All of my examples for Votes-Against vs Margins have been
> spatial examples, with a 1-dimensional policy-space or
> political spectrum. Some might object that that's a simplification,
> but it's a plausible one, and there really does tend to be
> such a policy space. In fact that has much to do with causing
> there to be a Condorcet winner.
> Now, I've thoroughly discussed Votes-Against with regard to
> the need for defensive strategy, with special emphasis on
> elections with 1-dimensional policy-space. But let me just
> repeat the highlights: In Votes-Against, defensive strategy
> needn't include voting for a more-liked alternative equal to or
> over a less-liked one. And, if there's a Condorcet winner, and
> if no one attempts offensive order-reversal, there's _no_ need
> for _any_ defensive strategy. No one need do other than rank
> sincerely as many alternatives as they want to, without regard
> to defensive strategy.
> I've shown why that isn't true of Margins. I've shown that
> mere truncation can make necessary a defensive strategy of
> ranking a less-liked alternative equal to your favorite.
> I've shown that order-reversal, which Margins doesn't deter,
> can make necessary the defensive strategy of ranking a less-liked
> alternative _over_ your favororite, in the Margins method.
> Again I ask: Can a method get worse than that?
> Mike

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