Approval and LO2E

[Mike Ositoff]

> 
> I think it's worth pointing out that Approval's LO2E assurance
> is rather different from the ranked methods'.  That is, in the

I haven't made a secret of that, Blake: Approval doesn't assure
you that you'll never have strategic need to vote a less-liked
alternative equal to your favorite--but then neigher does
Margins :-)

done for now



> ranked methods, if there is a candidate ranked last on a majority
> of ballots, that candidate will lose, and another candidate will
> win.  In approval, the majority may void the election by doing
> this.  Voiding the election could be there last choice, even
> below the candidate they are trying to defeat, but approval
> doesn't even ask how they feel about this.
> 
> When the election is voided, if a new election is held, the same
> candidate, or a very similar one, could appear again.  If the
> candidate's party has enough money to keep running candidates,
> it may be able to outlive the other parties in repeated
> elections.  To prevent this, some of the other voters will 
> have to abandon their favorite for a compromise.  This seems
> like government by the most stubborn, since the most stubborn
> people will hold their ground through repeated elections until
> other voters are forced to accept their candidate.
> 
> Demorep suggests that if the election is voided, the winner should
> be chosen by officials who are already elected.  But they could
> easily choose the majority worst candidate, or at least a
> candidate who would be majority worst if presented to the public.
> 
> ---
> Blake
> 
> 
> 
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