Approval and twins

Mike Ositoff ntk at
Wed Oct 28 18:02:56 PST 1998

> I consider rich-party and vote-splitting to be two of the most
> important problems, so I think it's important to ask how well
> approval does in regard to them.
> Certainly, approval passes GITC.  However, GITC was designed
> for rank methods.  In theory, plurality passes GITC.

In no way could Plurality be said to pass the Clone-Independence
Criterion, if that's what GITC refers to. If an added clone
splits the vote, it could make the former wininer in the clone
set lose.

You say that Approval passes GITC. If GITC is designed for rank
methods, but Approval passes it anyway, I guess I don't understand
what the problem is.

done for the time being

> In ranked methods, a voter can differentiate between the
> members of a party, and still rank those members higher than
> anybody else.  This is not possible with approval.  In
> approval, a voter must decide whether to help the party as
> much as possible, or to differentiate between members of
> the party.  And if voters tend to vote purely along party
> lines, the choice within the party could be made by very
> few people.
> There are two strategies that I can imagine voters employing.
> They will largely be psychologically determined, so it would
> be necessary to find out which is used by polling and
> observation.
> Except Worst
> The voter votes for most members of the party, but witholds from
> a few of his least favorites.
> Only Best
> The voter votes only for a few of his favorite candidates from
> within his party.
> If a party thinks its voters fall into the "Except Worst" category,
> then it makes sense to run more candidates, and thereby spread out
> the "No" votes.  If on the other hand they follow the "Only Best"
> strategy, it makes sense to run fewer candidates in order to
> concentrate the "YES" votes.
> ---
> Blake
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