Schulze, SEC, & many candidates

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Mr. Cretney wrote-
> An interesting problem with VA, which I have previously not methioned,
> is that it requires the kind of weighing of interests I mentioned above.
> For example, if I sincerely rank A > B > C, I could vote this way.
> However, I can increase the likelihood C will be defeated by voting
> A = B > C.  In other words, to have the most effective vote against
> C, I must not express my preference between A and B.  Of course, this 
> sort of weighing of interests is one of the most obvious characterstics
> of Approval, but it seems out of place in a ranked method.

Mr. Ossipoff wrote--
It's very much out of place in a ranked method. It's never needed
in VA, for protecting a CW, except if offensive strategy uses
an impossible degree of predictive knowledge and sophistication.
Offensive strategizers would have to not only create a cycle with
their order-reversal. They'd have to also engineer a subcycle
in which everyone is majority-beaten. Forget it.
---
D-- I mention again that there will be polls (in any free country).  Any
candidate who is not a clear CW in the polls will likely strategize and try to
get his/her supporters to follow the candidate's strategy WHATEVER the reform
method is (noting again Mr. Arrow's observations).