Schulze, SEC, & many candidates

[Mike Ositoff]

I left something out: As I & Markus have said, Schulze's method,
with votes-against, doesn't create a situation, when nothing
is known about other voters, where a voter indifferent between
2 candidates can rank one over the other without risk to his
favorite, in general.

Sure, as Blake pointed out, that situation can exist for Schulze(VA)
when there are just 3 candidates. But when there are sufficiently
many candidates, and you insincerely order 2 candidates between
whom you're indifferent, you might be strengthening the beat-path
that will make your favorite lose to someone else by beat-paths.

So the problem, if it were a problem, is limited, with Schulze(VA),
to examples with very few candidates (3? 3 or 4?). But in my
recent "Sincerity, strategy" posting I talked about why it
isn't a problem anyway, for any VA method.

Mike