# Standards

DEMOREP1 at aol.com DEMOREP1 at aol.com
Sat Jun 27 10:30:12 PDT 1998

```Mr. Saari may have missed my earlier observations-

Number voting (1, 2, etc.) ONLY shows relative approval.

Such being the case, I suggest again that there also be a YES/NO vote on the
acceptability of each candidate (choice) for executive and judicial offices.
Only candidates that have YES majorities would undergo the head to head math

I note again that the top 2 in a runoff method is currently used in runoff
partisan primary elections in about 10 States in order to get a majority
winner in the party's primary election.

Before it was declared unconstitutional in Dec. 1997, Louisiana had a blanket
primary for U.S. Representatives in which if a candidate got a majority in the
primary, then he/she was deemed elected. If no candidate got a majority in the
primary, then only the top 2 in the primary had their names put on the general
election ballots (producing a majority winner).

Thus, I suggest that the only standard/principle/criteria that need be worried

As I have noted, many single ballot methods for executive and judicial offices
have major defects in choosing the *correct* majority (when it is divided).

I note again the simple case
26 A B
25 B A
49 Z

Assuming that A, B and Z all have YES majorities, then the sincere 49 Z voters
(who don't especially like A or B) can do nothing or insincerely choose the
lesser of the alleged evils).  If they are insincere, then so what ? The
winner gets elected with some sort of majority.

This list got off on the wrong track a long time ago with too many 3 choice
circular tie examples and no 4 or 5 choices examples (showing the major
complexity of having divided majorities).

When there are 3 or more choices (with 1 to be chosen), the ONLY possibilities
are--
A.  Defeat all but the winner at one time.
B.  Defeat 1 or more at a time (some sort of successive defeat method)  ending
up with 1 winner.
C.  No majority choice is made.

```