Regretted Turnout. Insincere = ranking.

[Mike Ositoff]

About the number of Criteria, there apparently are more than
I've heard of. Something called "consistency", which is conveniently
met only by the method proposed by author who defined the criterion.
I don't remember what Consistency is, but you can find it in
the Winter quarter issue of _Journal of Economic Perspectives_ that
has been referred to on EM. I don't remember what year it was, but
it might be the winter of 95-96, and be called Winter '95 issue.

Academics & others can come up with unlimited numbers of criteria.
Many of the new criteria defined on EM are useful, though some of
them, as I've said, seem to me to be "fine-tuning". I consider
GMC to be a crucially important extension of majority rule to
multi-candidate elections. Never avoidably elect something to
which a majority prefer something else. When majority rule, in
that form, is preserved, the LO2E problem is minimized, and
(which is the same thing) the need for defensive strategy is
minimized.

***

Sure, in an EM poll, we could suggest that people vote a different
ranking, so they can apply the appropriate defensive (and offensive?)
strategy for each method by which we'll do the count.

But I recommend against that, because for one thing, people are
reluctant enough to vote even _one_ ranking. Besides, if counted
by a good method, little or no strategy is needed.

So I prefer my "Voter's Choice" solution, when no voting method
is agreed-upon:

Do the count by every method proposed.

Every voter has a Plurality vote.

Let the voter indicate which method's winner he wants to have
his Plurality vote.

The winner is the alternative with the most Plurality votes.

Advantage: If you've chosen, as your Plurality-vote bestowing
method, a method that succeeds in picking the Condorcet winner,
your needed compromise, then your Plurality vote goes to the
candidate that you need to give it to. The beauty of it is that
every voter can choose for _himself_ which is the best count rule
for picking the Condorcet winner or necessary compromise.

(Of course, in an EM vote on voting methods, a default assumption
could be that your top-ranked method is also your Plurality-vote
bestowing method).

Mike