Reverse Bucklin tiebreaker

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Markus Schulze wrote:

in the last days, you have spamed the Election Methods
Mailing List with mails about the Reverse Bucklin tiebreaker.
You have explained the Reverse Bucklin tiebreaker in detail
and calculated many examples. But you haven't written
anything about the expected advantages of this tiebreaker.

Thus, I want to ask you: 
[1] Why do you propose the Reverse Bucklin tiebreaker? 
[2] What do you expect from this tiebreaker? 
[3] What are the advantages of this tiebreaker? 
[4] Which criteria do you use to justify its superiority?
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D- Comment- Whether or not something is spam depends on the mind of the
beholder (as with art, music, etc.).   The EM has been a work under continous
revision since it was formed.

Answers- 
1. Because it works without many of the "obvious" defects of other
tiebreakers.  See my next post about methods with defective majorities.   I
again thank Mr. Schulze for his 5 choice examples which helped produce the
Reverse Bucklin idea. 
2. To get a consensus majority winner.
3. Same as 1.
4. Same as 1 and 2.   The average voter is not interested in criteria in
getting a majority winner or whether one method has some sort of superority
over another method. However, the average voter is obviously interested in
whether a method has some obvious defect(s).   Any method with 3 or more
choices has problems as shown by Mr. Arrow.