Reverse Bucklin tiebreaker

Michael McPhail libearal at hotmail.com
Tue Jun 16 12:42:13 PDT 1998

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----Original Message Follows----
From: DEMOREP1 at aol.com
Date: Sun, 14 Jun 1998 16:58:00 EDT
To: election-methods-list at eskimo.com
Subject: RE: Reverse Bucklin tiebreaker

Supplement 2

Back to election math course 1 or 101 (for folks who went to college) --

51 A Z
49 Z A

There is both a first choice majority for A and a Reverse Bucklin
majority
against Z.

The majority splits (as it often does)--

26 A B Z
25 B A Z
49 Z

or a more drastic

49 A B Z
2  B A Z
49 Z

The Reverse Bucklin majority against Z continues.  Some of the 49 Z
voters may
or may not be sincere in wanting A or B to win.  It is irrelevant
whether or
not they are sincere.  Arrow's Principle regarding 3 or more choices
intervenes.

Conclusion (again) -- most if not all of the criterion, principles, etc.
are
irrelevant in picking a single winner.  Majority rule is THE criterion,
principle, etc. in picking a single winner.  A majority both elects one
and
defeats each of the losers.

If a voter votes a truncated vote (voting for fewer than the number of
choices), then for purposes of Reverse Bucklin the truncated choices are
all

Example--
100 voters
17 A > B > C
17 B > C > A
17 C > A > B
25 Y > Z
24 Z > Y

The votes would be treated as

17 A > B     > C  > blank > (Y=Z)
17 B > C      > A > blank > (Y=Z)
17 C > A      > B > blank > (Y=Z)
25 Y > Z > blank > blank > (A=B=C)
24 Z > Y > blank > blank > (A=B=C)

Both Y and Z have a truncated Reverse Bucklin majority vote against
them.

Result- More voters would probably make more relative choices.
Some of the 49 Y and Z first choice voters might want to vote a third
choice
for the lesser evil among A, B, C.

is a
matter of major regret that Mr. Condorcet and Mr. Bucklin are not around
to be
praised for their major works.

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