Reverse Bucklin tiebreaker

DEMOREP1 at aol.com DEMOREP1 at aol.com
Mon Jun 15 16:02:04 PDT 1998


Supplement 4

Since Bucklin accumulates the first plus second choices, first plus second
plus third choices, etc., there is ---

C = Choices, PBM = Possible Bucklin majorities 

C        1    2    3    4    5    6

PBM    1   3    5     7    9    11

or PBM = (2 x C) - 1

In other words, a voter would not have to make too many choices to pick a
single winner using Reverse Bucklin. 
I mentioned in Supplement 2 that truncated votes using Reverse Bucklin would
quickly cause minority choices to lose.

Thus, I estimate that if there is anything near a "normal" distribution of
first choice votes in a public election that all voters would probably not
need to vote for more than about 4 or 5 choices to get a single winner. 

Another obvious point-- even some minimal ballot access requirement (such as a
0.5-2.0 percent nominating petition) for public offices would reduce the
number of candidates (choices).  How many serious candidates would be running
for major single winner offices (U.S. President, governors, mayors, etc.) if
there were such equal nominating petitions ??

In other developments-- Candidates for U.S. President in 2000 are already
running in New Hampshire and Iowa- a mere 19 months before the
primaries/caucuses in such States.   

I suggest that everyone on this list ask the newsmedia in NH and IA to ask the
voters to numerically rank their choices so that head to head math can be done
(and especially to show the danger and stupidity of plurality winners/nominees
for such office).



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