Near Clone Sets

[Markus Schulze]

Dear Mike,

I have a question: Many election methods have the problem,
that they sometimes "punish" voters for going to the poll.

Example 1:

  35 voters vote B > A > C > D.
  30 voters vote C > D > B > A.
  20 voters vote A > C > D > B.
  15 voters vote D > B > A > C.

  The matrix of wins and defeats looks as follows:

  A:B=20:80
  A:C=70:30
  A:D=55:45
  B:C=50:50
  B:D=35:65
  C:D=85:15

  As B > A > C > D > B, every candidate is in the Smith Set.
  The winner of Smith//Condorcet(EM) is candidate B.

Example 2:

  Suppose, that 6 additional voters go to the poll, who
  vote D > B > C > A. Then we have:

  35 voters vote B > A > C > D.
  30 voters vote C > D > B > A.
  20 voters vote A > C > D > B.
  15 voters vote D > B > A > C.
   6 voters vote D > B > C > A.

  The matrix of wins and defeats looks as follows:

  A:B=20:86
  A:C=70:36
  A:D=55:51
  B:C=56:50
  B:D=35:71
  C:D=85:21

  As B > A > C > D > B, every candidate is in the Smith Set.
  The winner of Smith//Condorcet(EM) is candidate C.

  In other words: By going to the poll, the 6 additional
  voters change the winner from candidate B to candidate C,
  although they rank candidate B higher than candidate C.
  The additional 6 voters are "punished" for going to the
  poll.

If Tideman or Schulze were used, the effect would
be the same: The winner would be changed from
candidate B to candidate C. Thus, this seems to me to be
a problem for many election methods.

Is it possible (maybe in a very simple way) to "patch"
the currently discussed election methods in such a way,
that it is not possible for them to "punish" voters for
going to the poll?

It is possible (maybe in a very simple way) to prove,
that every election method, that meets some other
desirable criteria, necessarily "punishes" voters for
going to the poll in some situations?

Markus