Truncation with Condorcet
Blake Cretney
bcretney at my-dejanews.com
Fri Aug 7 23:28:54 PDT 1998
--
On Fri, 7 Aug 1998 04:00:54 Mike Ositoff wrote:
>On Thu, 6 Aug 1998, Blake Cretney wrote:
>
>> Why would anyone ever sincerely truncate a ballot under
>> Condorcet? Wouldn't it make much more sense to fill
>> in all the other candidates randomly. After all, this
>> can only help you're candidate, and if you consider
>> the others to be equal, there's no risk.
>Lots of reasons why people truncate non-strategically.
>
>Maybe someone hasn't heard anything about any but a few
>candidates. It doesn't help his favorite(s) to rank lower
>choices (it doesn't hurt them either). So, that voter
What about this example?
24 A B C \ Sincere preference A > B=C
24 A C B /
23 B A C
29 C B A
The A 1st voters took my advice and marked the other
candidates randomly instead of truncating. They came
out even.
A B C
A X 48 71
B 52 X 47
C 29 53 X
Max loss
52 53 71
A wins
Now here's what happens if they vote sincerely and
truncate
48 A
23 B A C
29 C B A
A B C
A X 48 71
B 52 X 23
C 29 29 X
Max loss
52 48 71
B wins
So unless I've made some kind of error here, it can
sometimes hurt to use truncation instead of my random
fill strategy.
The question is, is there any situation where this can
backfire? That would give a reason not to always use
my random fill strategy.
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