Normative principles of elections- Condorcet, etc.

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Mr. Blake Cretney wrote in part---

IA, which I will call IIAC, is not possible.
Consider this example.

Ballots cast
45 A B C
35 B C A
20 C A B
****
So in fact no method will satisfy IIAC.
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D- I suggest that IIAC is not relevant (like most criterion floating around).
The first 2 choices (assuming that they indicate approval/ acceptability)
produce--
A 65
B 80
C 55
C should lose with the weakest support. Thus, A beats B 65 to 35.

If all votes are YES votes, then the general case would have the first N
minus1 place votes would be a tiebreaker.
Example-
5 tied choices
The votes for the first 4 places would be added.
The choice with the lowest support would lose and the head to head math would
be rechecked.

If all votes are not YES votes, then the last place YES votes on all ballots
would be dropped (repeatedly, if necessary) until a choice does not have a
majority.